In mid-April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called on Europe to create a unified missile defense system. With the high intensity of Russian strikes putting Ukraine’s missile defense under severe strain, Kyiv is actively seeking ways to address this problem. Washington has shown itself to be an unreliable ally: the Trump administration is not interested in supporting Ukraine, and new U.S. military campaigns have accelerated the consumption of munitions that could otherwise have been supplied to Kyiv. Europe’s production output of interceptor missiles is insufficient to counter Russian threats, and its existing air-defense procurement programs do not include Ukraine. However, initiatives aimed at strengthening both Ukrainian and pan-European defense have already emerged, with Kyiv’s active participation. Europe can provide equipment, while Ukraine can contribute combat experience and operational testing, according to Sam Lair, a researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the United States.
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During a national news marathon in mid-April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that “we should have a European anti-ballistic missile defense system. We are in talks with several countries and are working in this direction.” As Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine proceeds into its fifth year, it’s understandable why Zelensky is interested in a European anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The Ukrainians are facing intense demand and supply pressures on their existing ABM systems, and are actively seeking a solution.
On the demand side, Ukraine continues to endure relentless Russian missile strikes. This persistent threat runs counter to some of the initial expectations from the early days of the full-scale war. Shortly after the invasion, many expected that sanctions, export controls, and the Russian economy’s inability to replace certain key components like semiconductors would significantly reduce Russia’s ability to sustain ballistic missile strikes at a high volume due to the collapse of its domestic missile industry. In October 2022, as sanctions and export controls began to bite, the U.S. State Department announced that “Russian hypersonic ballistic missile production has nearly ceased due to the lack of necessary semiconductors.” And indeed, Russian missile strikes of all kinds declined throughout 2023, perhaps reflecting the depletion of the Russian stockpile, coupled with production challenges.
Shortly after the invasion, many expected that sanctions would significantly reduce Russia's ability to sustain ballistic missile strikes at a high volume
However, this was not to last, as the Russians manoeuvred to circumvent these new constraints. In the fall of 2023, Russia began importing Hwasong-11 missiles, called the KN-23 and -24 by the U.S. intelligence community, from North Korea. Pyongyang even expanded the factory that manufactures and assembles the Hwasong-11 series. While part of that expansion was likely to fill domestic production, the Russian demand signal likely played a role as well.
In addition to importing whole missiles, Russia has succeeded in building networks to evade export controls and acquire key components. They are still able to acquire U.S.-made components for their ballistic missiles, likely through unsanctioned secondary countries like Turkey or China. China appears to have been a big help beyond providing an unsanctioned import path, letting the Russians maintain access to electronics and many other dual-use goods.
Finally, the Russians have recapitalized their domestic missile industry, expanding solid propellant production plants and factories for ballistic missiles like the Iskander. In combination, these measures have allowed the Russians to rebound from the 2023 nadir in their strike volume against Ukraine.
Since then, the number and size of strikes have picked up. In April 2026, the Russians launched more drones and missiles than in any other month of the war. Just a few days before Zelensky’s comments on ABMs, Russia conducted one of its largest drone and missile attacks yet, launching at least 19 ballistic missiles into Ukraine. Not only is there still demand for missile defenses in Ukraine, but that demand is growing significantly as the Russian missile industry rebounds from the effects of sanctions and export controls.
Despite these redoubled attacks, the supply side for missile defenses and missile defense interceptors is the likely source of the uncertainty driving Zelensky’s comments about a European ABM solution. Ukraine currently relies on the U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability-2 and -3 (PAC-2/3) systems. Patriot batteries have been donated or sold to Ukraine by a number of countries, including the U.S. and Germany. The Patriots are complemented by two SAMP/T batteries made by the Eurosam Consortium, donated by Italy and France.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has shown itself to be a fickle ally and, therefore, an unreliable source of interceptors for Ukraine for two reasons. The first involves U.S. domestic politics, with elements of the Republican Party having revealed themselves to be uninterested in aiding Ukraine in its fight against the Russian invasion. As the Trump administration took over last year, the Pentagon froze aid to Ukraine, and there still is not a solid base of support for Ukraine in the ruling party in Washington, leaving Ukraine dependent on the whims of American domestic politics for its supply of interceptors.
The U.S. has shown itself to be a fickle ally and, therefore, an unreliable source of interceptors for Ukraine
Second is the Trump administration’s appetite for military adventurism. Military operations in the Middle East have cut deeply into Patriot stockpiles, reducing the number available to go to Ukraine. In the wake of Operation Midnight Hammer last June (the U.S. strikes against the Iranian nuclear program that came on the heels of the Israeli-launched 12-Day War), U.S. Patriot batteries in Qatar were drawn into what was then the largest Patriot engagement in history, defending against retaliatory Iranian missile attacks. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine didn’t specify how many interceptors were fired during the defense, remarking only that “it was a bunch.” Yet it was enough that some figures among the Pentagon leadership were able to worry about whether there was enough slack in the interceptor stockpile to justify halting shipments to Ukraine.
Operation Epic Fury earlier this year has only compounded this problem. While the 12-Day War was mainly a regional-range missile engagement, with longer-range Iranian missiles launched at Israel being intercepted by regional-range American missile defenses like the SM-3 and THAAD, this new Persian Gulf War has been a much shorter-range affair. The deep reservoir of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles aimed at the Gulf states has consumed vast quantities of American Patriot interceptors. Estimates vary, but an analysis by CSIS suggests that somewhere in the ballpark of 1,060-1,430 were used. It doesn’t help that the U.S. has been using Patriots to intercept Iranian drones like the Shahed-136, which have been fired in very large numbers. The mismatch in cost between the two provoked Representative Ted Lieu to compare those intercepts to “throwing Ferraris at frisbees.” It seems imprudent for Ukraine to rely on key munitions from an ally that has demonstrated a liability to start wars of choice, which are a huge drain on the supply of those essential interceptors.
The deep reservoir of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles aimed at the Gulf states has consumed vast quantities of American Patriot interceptors
The rapid consumption of Patriots during the rounds of fighting between the U.S. and Iran has also underscored the anaemic state of Patriot interceptor production. Lockheed Martin plans to expand throughput to around 2000 PAC-3 interceptors per year by 2030. Annual production rates currently sit at around 600 interceptors, and given that 18 other countries rely on PAC for air and missile defense, Ukraine finds itself bumping elbows with many potential competitors for a rather small production pool.
A similar throughput problem afflicts Ukraine’s other source of ABMs, the SAMP/T. Accounting for serious expansions in the production base for that interceptor, annual deliveries of the ABM-capable versions of the Aster 30 used by the SAMP/T are likely around 190-270. However, as fewer countries rely on that system, there is less competition for deliveries, meaning Ukraine could benefit from much of the expanded production. Ukraine will also be part of the operational testing for the upgraded SAMP/T NG system, which is being developed by Eurosam.
In the meantime, given these supply-side challenges, it is not surprising that Zelensky is floating a European ABM solution. There is already a proto-European ABM solution, but Ukraine isn’t part of it. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proposed the European Sky Shield Initiative in 2022 to coordinate air and missile defense procurement on the continent. The Initiative has been controversial, drawing criticism from French President Macron, for instance, for failing to prioritize European-made systems like SAMP/T over American-made Patriots or Israeli-made Arrows. Macron complained that by buying American, the Germans were “preparing the problems of tomorrow!”
Marcon’s issue with Sky Shield comports with long-standing French concerns about the U.S. having a monopoly on key defense technologies, and ABM in particular, dating back to even before Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Despite French frustrations, the ESSI has expanded to include 24 countries, including non-NATO members Austria and Switzerland.
The growth of ESSI reflects a clear-eyed assessment by many European countries of the threat posed by Russia’s missile arsenal. The invasion of Ukraine, which Scholz characterized as a “Zeitenwende,” or historic turning point, demonstrated the inadequacy of continental defenses against a mature missile force. While the NATO Integrated Air Defense System and the Aegis Ashore installations in Poland and Romania, in particular, represent good foundations, they were not commensurate with the threat. The initial deficit in the face of the Zeitenwende has become more acute as Germany and others have transferred large numbers of air defense systems and missile defense interceptors, drawing down national stocks. This is not to say they should not have sent those systems to Ukraine — quite the opposite. But there is now a clear space for ESSI to help replenish air and missile defenses in Europe in a consistent and coordinated fashion to address the gap between the enduring Russian missile industry and European interceptor stockpiles.
The growth of ESSI reflects a clear-eyed assessment by many European countries of the threat posed by Russia's missile arsenal
The fundamental economics of missile defense, the simple fact that offensive missiles will almost always be much cheaper than defensive interceptors, means expanded defenses must be complemented by capable offensive forces. As the 12-Day War and Operation Epic Fury demonstrated, perhaps the best missile defense is a strong anti-missile offense. Nevertheless, ESSI is a good first step toward redressing this divergence.
While the initiative will provide some level of coordination for procurement, it is not an industrial policy focused on expanding interceptor production, nor have there been reports that Ukraine will join soon. While ESSI helps coordinate air and missile defense projects across the continent, it does not finance new production lines. Though that might be a knock-on effect of coordinated purchasing, it is not a direct investment in ABM production. This reality means ESSI is not a solution to the near- and medium-term Russian missile problem Zelensky and the Ukrainians face, even if Ukraine were to join — hence the Ukrainian President’s call for a European ABM system.
Returning to that call, the paucity of details in the proposal (if it can even be called that) makes it hard to tell whether it will produce a meaningful initiative. ESSI demonstrates that Europe is paying more attention to missile defense in the wake of the invasion, and I’m sure states are feeling even more pressure as the U.S. burns through interceptors at an astonishing clip in the Middle East. Yet it is still unclear what exactly Zelensky is asking for. Is it an integrated missile defense architecture for Europe? A large-volume production ABM akin to Patriot? I believe it is probably the latter, but we won’t know until more details emerge. The level of detail in any proposal that comes out of this conversation will be the best gauge of whether Zelenzky’s call to action has momentum and could translate into policy and programming. If some sort of framework or roadmap emerges with specifics, that would be a positive sign.
The good news is that investment is already happening, and it is happening with Ukraine. Eurosam is expanding its production lines for SAMP/T to increase throughput, and the Ukrainians will have the chance to test the upgraded SAMP/T NG against Russian missiles. This collaboration isn’t only altruistic; it will help strengthen the next generation of ABMs, which seem to be Europe’s best bet for building a continental ABM system. While other European states can offer hardware, the Ukrainians can offer experience, operational testing, and hard performance data to improve current and future ABMs. In an ideal world, this would be the start of a sustained effort to grapple with the supply side problems that Ukraine — and Europe more broadly — faces in their effort to defend against Russian ballistic missiles in a world where the U.S. is a less reliable partner.