On April 25, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he had called off a trip by an American delegation to Islamabad, Pakistan, for talks with Iran. The move followed signs that the White House’s reliance on “decapitation strikes” had failed to produce a military solution to the conflict. Washington and Tehran now face the task of finding a deal acceptable to both sides, though divisions inside Iran’s leadership remain an obstacle. But even radicals in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have already shown a willingness to compromise, writes Antonio Giustozzi, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). And while the sides remain far apart on the issue of uranium, Iran may make concessions on the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for sanctions relief and the unfreezing of assets.
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Everyone outside a few figures in the Trump administration can now see that the premise of the February 28 decapitation strikes against the Iranian regime was mistaken. The physical elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the senior leaders of the armed forces did not compel Iran to bow to U.S. demands. Since the Americans have not been able to identify a path to military victory, the question has now become how to negotiate a deal with the Iranians that at least offers the Trump administration a somewhat plausible claim to “victory.”
A major problem is that, given how the Americans and the Israelis have kept targeting military and political leaders throughout the war, the power map of the Islamic Republic is far from clear — often, even to senior Iranian officials.
The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his father raised more questions than it answered. Mojtaba has a reputation for holding more radical views than his father, although distinguishing personal persuasions from the institutional role of mediator among factions and personalities in Ali Khamenei’s decision-making is not easy.
The real issue, in any case, is what role Mojtaba is really playing. While it is understandable that he might never appear in public, he has made no appearance on video or audio either. While sources within the regime all agree that he was seriously wounded in the same strike that killed his father, as well as his wife and daughter, many started believing that he is not able to function at all.
While sources within the regime all agree that he was seriously wounded in the same strike that killed his father, many started believing that he is not able to function at all
Very few individuals have had access to Mojtaba, and for almost two months the only policymaker among them was Ahmad Wahidi, the head of the Revolutionary Guards. Among those who questioned Wahidi’s account of Mojtaba’s thinking were also leading Iranian government figures, such as President Pezeshkian himself. According to sources within the Revolutionary Guards, Pezeshkian repeatedly questioned Wahidi’s account and requested direct access to Mojtaba or, failing that, at least video or audio messages from the new Supreme Leader, stating his views on specific issues. After much resistance, a regime source said he and several other senior officials were finally able to meet Mojtaba face to face in late April to discuss policy.
The fact that Pezeshkian has to beg Wahidi for access to the Supreme Leader says a lot about the expanded power and role of the Revolutionary Guards, who manage the entire war effort through the Military Council. The growing dominance of the Revolutionary Guards is also boosted by their ability to operate in a decentralised way. The moment the air campaign against Iran was launched on February 28, the Revolutionary Guards switched to a decentralised command and control system that allowed them to continue operating much more effectively than other military agencies, especially the Iranian army and air force. Their relatively strong performance has legitimized the Guards’ leadership role in the war.
None of this means, however, that the Revolutionary Guards are in full control. Despite the public bravado, the Guards’ leadership and rank-and-file know full well that there is widespread opposition to the regime within Iran, even if U.S.-Israeli attacks on targets including hospitals, civilian infrastructure, and even historical monuments quickly made it clear that the air campaign was not aimed at “liberating” Iran from the Islamic Republic, but at weakening the Iranian state and its economic and military potential, perhaps up to the point of causing its implosion.
Sources within the Revolutionary Guards are all well aware that any rise in patriotic sentiments will not last much beyond the end of the war, especially if Iran’s economic degradation continues. This seems to be a recurrent theme even at internal Guards briefings: the stress is on the need to ensure that the Islamic Republic finishes the conflict while it still has the resources to rebuild, otherwise the regime might not survive the resulting peace.
The IRGC’s leadership and rank-and-file know full well that there is widespread opposition to the regime within Iran, and any rise in patriotic sentiments will not last much beyond the end of the war
Iranian government sources put the damage inflicted on Iran so far at $260 billion, and when it comes to the need to find the resources to rebuild, everybody in Teheran agrees. However, the government believes that taking a softer approach in negotiations could isolate the Americans, avoid additional damage to infrastructure, and deliver a deal faster. By contrast, the Guards believe that in order to convince Trump and Netanyahu to end the war on terms acceptable to Tehran, Iran has to show that it can keep going regardless of the mounting costs.
The Guards believe that the regime must show a united front to its enemies, even if the hardliners’ criticism of reformist politicians at home hints at the existence of internal divisions. Pezeshkian’s occasional tweets, diverging from the line agreed behind closed doors, always draw the worst reactions from the Revolutionary Guards, such as when, immediately after the ceasefire was agreed, the president announced the opening of the Strait of Hormuz without clearly stating the conditions attached to the move — namely the screening measures and fees that the Guards had lobbied for.
And yet, the sometimes bitter internal debates between decision-makers at the top of the regime still seem to be accepted as a fact of life, even by the Guards. Aside from Wahidi — probably the most powerful man in Iran at the moment, given Mojtaba’s unclear status — other key players aligned with the Guards include Mohsen Rezaee (currently an adviser to Mojtaba) and Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr (the new Head of the Supreme National Security Council). While these men lobby for hardline outcomes, often what is finally decided is a compromise between their positions and those of the Pezeshkian camp, who is keener to keep the negotiations channel open in order to secure some way out of the conflict.
The sometimes bitter internal debates between decision-makers at the top of the regime still seem to be accepted as a fact of life
While Pezeshkian and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi position themselves as doves, the regime’s positions mostly reflect the views of conservative politicians, such as Ali Larijani (until his killing on 17 March) and Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. While these two are often described as completely aligned with the Revolutionary Guards, sources within the latter describe how Larijani and Qalibaf often advocated policies very different from what the Guards pushed for. Larijani reportedly mediated between the Guards and the government in an effort to secure agreement on a radical offer concerning a “zero stockpile” uranium enrichment program, which was made to the U.S. just before the start of the war during the negotiations in Oman. Later, it was Qalibaf who mediated between hardliners and doves to get the ceasefire approved.
The reason why the Guards consent to negotiating with the Pezeshkian government is something deeper than mere respect for the institutions of the Islamic Republic. Their awareness of the shaky foundations of the Islamic Republic makes it clear to them that they need to have Pezeshkian’s moderate reformists on board, despite the hardliners’ misgivings about politicians of all stripes. When President Trump alleged that diplomatic exchanges were going on in the run-up to the ceasefire agreement, the Guards ridiculed those claims, not only in public but also in internal meetings. “There is no way somebody within the government might be talking to the Americans without us knowing,” insisted a source within the Guards. Later, however, the Guards’ intelligence department figured out that Qalibaf had indeed been communicating with the Americans via the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Pakistani mediators. However upset and even humiliated they may have been, the Guards ended up accepting the fait accompli and giving up their opposition to the ceasefire.
The IRGC is making compromises with more moderate factions, as it is aware of the shaky foundations of the Islamic Republic
If the Guards do not have total control today, what should outsiders make of their imposition of Mojtaba as the new Supreme Leader? Sources within the Guards acknowledge that they spared no effort to push their candidate — Mojtaba — to the top. When the selection of the recently deceased Supreme Leader’s son encountered resistance within the ranks of the Experts Council, the Guards did not hesitate to aggressively lobby for him, going so far as to distribute financial incentives to the members of the Council. Sources within the Guards argue that for them it was essential to have Mojataba in charge in order to make sure that the Supreme Leader leaned towards the Guards rather than towards those softies in the government. Critics of the Guards argued that Mojtaba was unfit for the role and possibly sidelined, and that the Guards were fabricating statements and orders in his name. They eventually forced the Guards to give at least the most senior civilian officials some access to him — though as long as the war continues, the Guards may still get away with manipulating the situation..
The big question is what will happen if the war ends. At that point, the flaws in Mojtaba’s selection to the top job will become apparent — all the more so if it turns out he really is physically unable to perform his role.
Despite the American violations, Israel’s bombings of Lebanon, and misunderstandings over the re-opening of Hormuz, the Revolutionary Guards’ leadership reluctantly accepted the ceasefire — and even its extensions. They have also warmed up to some possible concessions concerning Iran’s 400+ kg of uranium enriched to 60%, with sources saying that they would be ready to accept handing over half of the amount to a third country for safekeeping. The Guards have so far refused concessions concerning the status of Hormuz, seeking to retain control over the waterway in order to raise funds for the reconstruction of Iran and, quite possibly, to assert Iranian dominance in the Gulf. They also seek to retain control over uranium enrichment for civilian purposes, support for the Axis of Resistance, and Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal.
Judging from what one can infer from the snippets of the internal discussions that sources within the regime are able to provide, the status of Hormuz might be negotiable, with the Guards emphasizing that the aim is to raise cash for reconstruction. Of course, the abolition of the international sanctions regime and the return of Iran’s frozen funds abroad could work just as well in this regard, with the added benefit of being at least somewhat more acceptable internationally.
Sources within the regime say the IRGC is ready to discuss the status of the Strait of Hormuz if it helps secure funding for the country’s reconstruction
While the Guards seemingly did not stop Larijani and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from offering “zero stockpiling” of fissile material before the war started, they now argue that Iran’s negotiating position has considerably strengthened, and they therefore oppose this concession. On the other hand, the U.S. still demands the dismantling of the entire nuclear programme, so the Guards might be aiming for a trade-off.
Agreeing on Iran’s ballistic missiles, whose range and number the Americans want to see curtailed, is going to be one of the toughest hurdles. The Guards know full well that the missiles are Iran’s only real deterrent left — and if anything, they want more of them, with better capabilities and longer range. The range of the missiles is really only an Israeli concern, but while Trump managed to get Israel to implement a ceasefire in Lebanon, forcing Netanyahu to swallow the status quo concerning the missiles might be too much, especially given the advances in precision and penetration capacity that the Iranians have been making.
Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance is perhaps somewhat easier to discuss. The Guards will never agree to reducing support, but given the weakening of the Axis in recent years and the logistical problems caused by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, perhaps some ambiguous formula can be worked out even here.