Ukraine’s growing activity in the Middle East and Africa amid the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran is turning Kyiv into an equal security partner in one of the world’s key regions. However, given Russia’s longstanding relationships with several of these same states, it remains unclear whether Ukraine’s new partnerships will endure after the war with Iran ends. After all, Ukraine has already strained its ties with some regional players by carrying out operations against Russian interests from the territory of other countries, none of whom want to be drawn into a conflict with Moscow.
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On April 13, Volodymyr Zelensky wrote Telegram that Ukrainian military expertise is in demand in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf countries. “At this stage, Ukraine is engaged in security talks with Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. There are requests regarding cooperation with Iraq,” Zelensky announced, adding that he had discussed the matter with National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov.
And the Middle East isn’t the only global hotspot where Ukraine is getting involved. “There is serious interest from African states. We are preparing the groundwork for deeper security agreements in Europe as well — we expect to achieve results as early as this week,” the Ukrainian president wrote. On April 14, a strategic agreement was signed with Germany.
The Telegram statement offered an outline of Zelensky’s two recent visits to the Middle East — one in late March and another in early April. The first trip included talks with the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan, while the second took him to Turkey and Syria.
Volodymyr Zelensky with Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa
Following talks with Riyadh and Doha, 10-year strategic military cooperation agreements were signed, while documents with Abu Dhabi and Amman are still being prepared. In Damascus, discussions focused on strengthening food security, exchanging military experience, and coping with the consequences of the war in the region. In Turkey, alongside the regional situation, the topic of a Russian-Ukrainian settlement was also raised.
The catalyst for Zelensky’s intensive round of meetings was, of course, the war in Iran. At the request of Trump and various Arab leaders, Kyiv sent more than 200 specialists to the Middle East to help repel attacks by Iranian drones and to train local militaries to do the same.
Cooperation in this area is planned to continue after the war as well, with Zelensky proposing to share Ukraine’s experience in addressing maritime security challenges. This is especially relevant given Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
The partnership agreements also envisage attracting Arab investment in Ukrainian technologies, particularly when it comes to drone production. In addition, Ukraine is counting on financial assistance, energy cooperation (including diesel fuel supplies), and political support from the Gulf states. According to Zelensky’s aforementioned post Kyiv is ready to help regional supporters of Ukrainian statehood “promptly and effectively.”
Kyiv had, of course, sought political support in the East before as well. In the summer of 2022, several months after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv turned its attention to regions where its presence had previously been minimal, appointing diplomat Maksym Subkh as the country’s special representative for the Middle East and Africa. After serving in that post for three years, Subkh became Ukraine’s ambassador to Kuwait.
Over the past four years, Ukraine’s contacts with the Middle East and Africa have increased markedly, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar repeatedly acting as mediators between Moscow and Kyiv in negotiations around prisoner exchanges and the return of Ukrainian children to their homeland.
The Gulf states have also served as a venue for talks. A year ago, Saudi Arabia first hosted Russian-American discussions, and then Ukrainian-American negotiations. Then, in January and February of this year, Abu Dhabi hosted two rounds of trilateral talks involving high-level representatives from Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington.
The relationship has certainly become less one-sided. At the Arab League summit in the summer of 2023, Zelensky tried to convey Ukraine’s concerns to those gathered in Jeddah. Now he has come to the Middle East not as a petitioner, but as an equal partner with something to offer. That said, this does not mean the Arabs will choose between Moscow and Kyiv — instead, they will prefer to use their relationships with both belligerents to their own advantage.
Zelensky has come to the Middle East for the first time not as a petitioner, but as an equal partner
Will Kyiv be able to preserve its beneficial ties with the Persian Gulf states after the end of the war with Iran? The London-based Arab Weekly, which in most cases reflects the position of the ruling elites in the UAE and partly Saudi Arabia, calls this “the million-dollar question,” given that there are hard limits on what Ukraine can achieve in the region.
In the view of the article’s author, the Gulf states will not join sanctions against Russia and will not expel Russian companies. After all, Russia remains a major supplier of wheat, an important source of capital for Dubai’s economy, and, as one of the world’s largest oil exporters, an indispensable partner in coordinating global energy policy within OPEC+. “These structural advantages, built over decades, cannot be undone by drone deals alone,” the author emphasizes.
According to him, the Gulf states are not eager to pick sides, but at the same time, Ukraine is playing its cards skillfully: “If the air forces of the Gulf states integrate Ukrainian interceptors into their air defense systems, and if Gulf investors finance Ukrainian factories, then severing relations will become more difficult.”
In the region, there are concerns that for Zelensky, the war with Iran is not a separate conflict but merely another front in the ongoing conflict betweenRussia and Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, the Arabs do not want to become involved in that fight, just as they did not want to be drawn into the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. “Even if Ukrainian drones prove more effective – and that requires further investigation and confirmation – they will not change the course of the war,” the Qatar-linked publication Al-Araby Al-Jadeed wrote back in March. The article urged the Gulf states to exercise caution when evaluating Zelensky’s proposals, citing Israel as an example of a state “which knows it is foolish to provoke Putin.”
No explanation was given for this, but it is worth recalling that Israel, despite some cooling in relations with Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022 and the Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, continues to maintain contacts with Moscow and was slow to provide military assistance to Kyiv. Nevertheless, last year it became known that Israel had transferred Patriot surface-to-air missile systems to Ukraine.
It should be noted that the issue of Israel also arises in the context of Zelensky’s visit to Damascus. “Syria needs an air defense system, but Israel apparently objects to the presence of Turkish systems there, while the West refuses to allow Russia to supply Syria with these weapons, so alternatives are needed,” Abdel Wahab Assi, director of the research unit at the Jusoor Center, told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. According to him, in this context Ukraine appears to be a suitable supplier for air defense systems and electronic warfare systems alike.
More broadly, Arab media note that Zelensky’s visit to Damascus took place under Ankara’s supervision — an aircraft from the Turkish president’s fleet was used for the Ukrainian leader’s flight to Syria, a trip that saw Zelensky accompanied by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. In addition to bilateral talks between Syria and Ukraine, trilateral negotiations were also held between Zelensky, Fidan, and Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa.
An aircraft belonging to the Turkish president was used for Zelensky’s flight to Syria
This was the first ever visit by a Ukrainian president to Syria. Relations between Kyiv and Damascus were strained after Moscow came to the aid of Bashar al-Assad in 2015, and when Syria recognized the independence of the Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics” in 2022, any remaining ties were severed altogether.
In 2023, media reports appeared that the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Defense Ministry (HUR) was operating in Syria against Russian forces, primarily the Wagner Group. In addition, after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, various outlets claimed that the terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the offensive on Damascus, had received around 150 drones from Ukrainian intelligence.
Kyiv has never officially confirmed this, but the role of drones during the final fight between Syrian armed groups and Assad’s army was highly visible, meaning Ahmed al-Sharaa, who traded his role as head of HTS for the post of Syria’s new president, certainly knows how useful Ukrainian assistance can be. At the same time, as Syrian experts emphasize, the development of relations between Damascus and Kyiv cannot be permitted to come at the expense of interaction with Moscow, which has also courted al-Sharaa’s government despite its prior years-long opposition to HTS during the Syrian civil war.
Syria was not the first distant arena for confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. According to The Washington Post, several HUR operations in South Africa aimed at disrupting arms supplies to Russia. In particular, in December 2022, HUR agents discovered that the Russian cargo vessel Lady R had docked at the Simon’s Town naval base to receive a shipment of weapons. HUR passed this information to Washington, and the U.S. ambassador in Pretoria publicly protested to the South African authorities. According to the Post’s sources, HUR agents also disrupted the transfer of weapons from South Africa by a Russian cargo aircraft.
Among other striking examples was the attack by Tuareg rebels in the summer of 2024 on a Wagner Group convoy in Mali. HUR hinted at involvement in that operation, after which Mali severed diplomatic relations with Kyiv, accusing it of supporting militants. In turn, Russian diplomats accused Ukraine of opening a “second front” in Africa.
Mali severed diplomatic relations with Kyiv, accusing it of supporting separatists
Even earlier, reports emerged of a possible confrontation between Ukraine’s HUR and the Wagner Group in Sudan. In September 2023, a CNN investigation pointed to the “Ukrainian style” of drone strikes against units of the Rapid Support Forces, which were said to be receiving support from the Wagner Group in their fight against the Sudanese army. In video footage obtained by CNN, Ukrainian text could be seen on the drone controller. Experts also noted that the tactic used – drones diving directly onto targets – was highly unusual for Sudan and for the African region as a whole.
Additionally, in the summer of 2023, Ukraine helped Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan leave the besieged capital of Khartoum. As The Wall Street Journal notes, al-Burhan had secretly supplied weapons to Kyiv after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
As a result, several weeks after al-Burhan made his appeal for help, Ukrainian special forces landed in Sudan and joined the fighting. The article noted that for Ukraine, deploying troops to Africa was “part of a strategy to disrupt Russia’s military and economic operations abroad, raise the cost of war for Moscow, and position itself as a bulwark against Russian incursions, including in regions where the West is reluctant to intervene directly.”
That confrontation continues to this day. Ukrainian military personnel are deployed in western Libya, according to an investigation by Radio France International (RFI), published in early April and devoted to a “shadow war unfolding on the African continent between Kyiv and Moscow.”
In particular, on March 4, 2026, Russia accused Ukrainian and British intelligence of attacking the Russian LNG tanker Arctic Metagaz off the coast of Libya. Russia’s Transport Ministry said it had been attacked by Ukrainian drone boats “from the Libyan coast.” The vessel is part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” and was sailing through the Mediterranean toward Egypt’s Port Said with a load of liquefied natural gas. According to Ukrainian intelligence, the vessel was also involved in transporting gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project to the Chinese terminal at Beihai.
The Russian tanker Arctic Metagaz drifting in the Mediterranean Sea
The case of the Arctic Metagaz is not the only example. In December 2025, Ukrainian media, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine, reported an unprecedented long-range operation – an attack by aerial drone on the Russian “shadow fleet” tanker Qendil, which at the time was in neutral waters between Greece and Libya.
According to RFI, more than 200 Ukrainian military officers and experts are currently stationed in Libya under an agreement with Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, head of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU). It is reported that the Ukrainian military is present at three locations. The first is on the grounds of the Air Force Academy in Misrata, where forces from the Turkish, Italian, and U.S. Africa Commands are stationed, along with a British intelligence center. The second base, near the coastal city of Zawiya, has been used to launch aerial and naval drones. And the third base, located at the headquarters of the Libyan army’s 111th Brigade near the airport in Tripoli, is where coordination meetings between the militaries of the two countries take place, with Abdul Salam al-Zoubi representing the Libyan side.
RFI notes that the agreement between Kyiv and Tripoli on a Ukrainian presence in Libya was reached through Ukraine’s military attaché in Algeria, General Andriy Bayuk, in October 2025. In return, Ukrainian specialists are training Libyans to operate drones. It is also claimed that the long-term agreement provides for arms sales and Ukrainian investment in Libya’s oil sector.
Of course, no official announcement has been made about the signing of any agreement on Ukrainian-Libyan military cooperation. However, reports regarding drone purchases and the arrival of Ukrainian experts in Libya began appearing in Libyan media as early as August 2025. For example, Nasser Ammar, head of Tripoli’s operational headquarters and the Directorate for Security and Operational Information, accused Dbeibah of using Ukrainian drones to settle scores with militia leaders opposed to him.
At the time, Ammar said that more than 20 combat drones and another 20 reconnaissance drones were stationed on the grounds of Tripoli’s old international airport. According to him, 12 Ukrainian experts had arrived in Libya to train personnel in assembling and operating these aircraft. The names of Abdul Salam al-Zoubi and Andriy Bayuk were also mentioned at the time in connection with the story.
It was claimed that 12 Ukrainian experts had arrived in Libya to train personnel in the assembly and operation of reconnaissance drones
Libyan journalists claimed that some of the drones were smuggled into Libya through Algeria with the help of intermediaries in Azerbaijan. According to media reports, in October 2025 these allegations became the subject of an investigation by the Libyan prosecutor general’s office into the activities of Al-Zoubi. However, it is unclear what has become of that investigation, and Al-Zoubi remains in his post.
Notably, most of the publications that appeared in 2025 on this subject came from opponents of Dbeibah, such as the Cairo-based Future Center, an analytical platform focused on regional issues. In October 2025, the center’s website quoted expert Anas al-Zeidani as saying that Ukraine’s initial benefit from selling drones to the government in Tripoli was purely financial in nature, but that given the appearance of Ukrainian specialists in Libya, the cooperation could evolve into something more substantial.
“It can be said that this deal is being carried out on the basis of an informal agreement between Ukraine and the United States,” al-Zeidani said, explaining that some of the drones are being supplied to armed groups “to counter the Russian presence in Libya” in line with Western plans.
The issue of the presence of Ukrainian military personnel in Libya reemerged in the Arab media space after the Arctic Metagaz incident and drew heavily on the work done by RFI in early April. The Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat not only reprinted the French outlet’s report, but also developed the story further.
Among the questions raised in the Saudi article was whether Libya would become “an arena of direct competition between Russia and Ukraine” given Russia’s longstanding military presence in eastern Libya. Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, Libya has remained fragmented, with Libyan National Army Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar largely controlling the east of the country.
The author also draws attention to the intensification in early April of contacts between Russia’s ambassador to Libya, Aidar Aganin, and Libyan military and political figures in Tripoli, including a meeting with Abdul Salam al-Zoubi. Of course, such contacts should not come as a surprise given that Moscow maintains relations with all sides in the Libyan conflict. The article also expresses the view that Dbeibah’s government “will not take steps that could draw it into the conflict” between Moscow and Kyiv.
In short, Tripoli is unlikely to differ from other Arab capitals when it comes to balancing its relationships with Kyiv and Moscow. It cooperates with Ukraine when necessary, but does not turn away from Russia either. At the same time, Libya fears a “hot confrontation” on its own territory — as practice shows, such outcomes are not always possible to avoid.