While public discussion remains focused on the negotiations over European security guarantees for Ukraine, the Zelensky administration’s recent attempt to seize control over anti-corruption agency NABU revealed the connection between domestic politics and the continued provision of Western aid. Kyiv’s international partners consider it essential for Ukraine to remain committed to democracy building and transparency efforts, viewing them as integral to the effectiveness of military and economic assistance. With Trump’s return to the White House, the role of the main external watchdog over Ukraine’s anti-corruption fight has shifted from the U.S. to Europe — with unclear consequences.
Corruption rules the game
This past July, the Zelensky government’s attempt to place the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office (SAPO) under the control of the country’s Prosecutor General was abruptly reversed following the rise of a widespread domestic protest movement. Internationally, the sharp reaction from European leaders made clear that Ukraine’s Western partners have concerns about the quality of governance in Kyiv, an issue with potential ramifications for the country’s ongoing war effort.
The EU demonstrated that it was prepared to take action to preserve the independence of NABU and SAPO, including by suspending the provision of some forms of aid until the status of the anti-corruption bodies had been restored. In addition, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul urged his Ukrainian counterpart Andriy Sybiha to maintain consistency in the fight against corruption and warned that curbing the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions would impede the country’s accession to the EU.
Whatever his motives were, President Zelensky could hardly have chosen a less fortuitous moment to target NABU and SAPO. The establishment and operation of independent anti-corruption bodies has always been a key requirement for all EU candidate countries, and the proper functioning of such institutions is all the more important for Ukraine given the massive amounts of wartime aid flowing to the country. As negotiations over new projects continue — and as American involvement in Kyiv’s war effort wanes — keeping the EU involved has to be a top priority for the Ukrainian leadership.
As peace talks continue to unfold and a framework for security guarantees develops, it is difficult to say how much this episode might cloud or complicate relations between Kyiv and Brussels. However, influential Europeans have previously directed critical remarks towards the Ukrainian leadership, with some of them coming from Kyiv's allies.
It was in this spirit that Armin Papperger, CEO of the defense company Rheinmetall, expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of construction of a defense plant in Ukraine. Focusing his commentary on bureaucracy rather than corruption, Papperger nevertheless noted that a similar facility in Germany, whose construction started at the same time, is already operational. As insignificant as this episode might appear on its own, a critical mass of such cases could provide ammunition to the numerous opponents of continuing and expanding European aid to Ukraine.
Armin Papperger, CEO of the German defense giant Rheinmetall, expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of construction of a defense plant in Ukraine
Should Europe suddenly decide to reduce its funding for Kyiv, corruption could serve as a convenient pretext. Under the circumstances, the Ukrainian authorities should strive to become a model of transparency and efficiency and scandals like the NABU-SAPO affair at any cost. This is especially important given the recent dramatic changes to the system of arms deliveries and overall support for Ukraine: today, individual countries are placing orders for Ukraine in the U.S., and Donald Trump promises that NATO will shoulder this burden entirely going forward.
Funds bypassing Kyiv
From the very first days of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. and the EU have joined forces to deliver various forms of aid, ranging from military supplies to budget support. The scale and timing of these deliveries have repeatedly been criticized for being slow and insufficient, yet they still amount to hundreds of billions of dollars and euros. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the situation changed. He immediately declared that this “isn't his war” and that Europe should henceforth assume full responsibility for aid to Kyiv.
For Europe, this is no simple task. From the outset, the organization of European aid to Kyiv involved financing either through the EU or from national government budgets. The programs overseen by Brussels are based on a scheme of direct financial assistance from the European Commission (MFA and MFA+, macro-financial assistance) that provides direct transfers of funds to Ukraine’s budget in order to help cover the expenses necessary for the functioning of the state.
Another EU program, the European Peace Facility, allows European states to partially offset the cost of arms deliveries to Kyiv, meaning aid provided through the EU can take the form of direct transfers to Ukraine’s budget or involve arrangements in which the funds do not physically reach Ukraine. While Ukraine needs cash to pay social benefits and pensions, military deliveries can be arranged differently.
A share of European aid to Ukraine involves funds that do not reach Ukraine directly
European governments have clearly preferred the latter form of support for Kyiv. One example is Czech President Petr Pavel’s initiative to purchase one million artillery shells for Ukraine, paying external suppliers directly. Another example is France’s provision of military training for a full brigade on its territory.
Individual EU countries have been willing to allocate substantial amounts to support Ukrainian resistance and prevent a Kremlin military victory, but whenever possible, financial flows have been arranged to bypass Kyiv.
The drive to generate revenue for the European economy can hardly justify this preference — after all, President Pavel’s initiative was aimed at purchasing shells outside the EU. That said, direct financing projects for Ukraine do exist — mainly in support of targeted humanitarian programs — but they are more charitable than systemic and remain relatively modest compared to the overall volume of aid.
At first glance, there seems to be a contradiction between this approach and Europe’s clear, repeatedly stated, and action-backed support for Ukraine and its people. However, Europe remembers that Ukraine ranks 105th in Transparency International’s corruption index. However, given that President Zelensky has already become a symbol of resistance — and the fact that no political alternative is on offer in Kyiv — Europeans must acknowledge that there are limits to establishing secure funding schemes.
This problem is unlikely to resolve itself even if a ceasefire is reached. Moreover, whatever the outcome of Donald Trump’s efforts, the EU will not be able to curb assistance to Ukraine. If the war continues, military aid will remain the top priority. If hostilities cease, attention will have to shift to rebuilding damaged territories, investing in production on Ukrainian soil (including of drones), creating conditions for the return of some refugees, integrating the Ukrainian army into European security systems, and much more. Of course, Europe has experience incorporating Eastern European countries into its structures, but Ukraine’s case will be more complex than that of Poland, the Czech Republic, or even Romania.
Is the EU up to the job?
The European economy has hit rough waters. The European Commission forecasts GDP growth of only 1.1% in EU countries in 2025, similar to the rates that have persisted in recent years. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Germany, France, and Italy — traditionally the driving forces of the EU — are experiencing crises for various reasons and will be forced to focus on domestic issues. Society and politicians are inclined more toward austerity than generosity.
U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance has long stated that Washington does not intend to continue supplying weapons to Ukraine for free, but that it is willing to do so if Europeans cover the costs. Germany has already stepped up to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine, although this initiative, important as it is, cannot replace systematic arms deliveries.
There is no consensus within the EU on how rearmament should proceed. France is relying on its own production, but it falls short of organizing large-scale supplies to Ukraine. Other countries plan to continue placing orders in the U.S., but there is no telling what share of these orders will actually reach Kyiv. Trump himself says that NATO, rather than the EU, will be procuring weapons for Ukraine from the Americans. Nevertheless, Trump's indirect interest in the Ukraine–European Union link is evidenced by his recent call to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to discuss the reasons why Budapest is blocking Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
A potential solution could involve the creation of a special EU fund to finance Ukrainian resistance — for instance, a joint EU loan similar to the post-COVID economic recovery program or the SAFE joint defense funding program. For now, however, Brussels has taken a pause, waiting for the outcome of American peace efforts. Those negotiations are currently focused more on military guarantees than on a comprehensive aid strategy.
At the same time, there has been real progress in organizing weapons production on Ukrainian soil, as evidenced by the aforementioned Rheinmetall project, among others. European arms manufacturers are ready to invest in Ukraine in order to incorporate the lessons learned from fighting the Russian military.
Unlike the Trump administration, the EU is not likely to distance itself from the Russian-Ukrainian war, as the conflict is indeed unfolding on European soil. However, the scale and modalities of aid to Ukraine will depend on many factors, including the European leaders' political will, which has recently been somewhat lacking.
Trump’s trade war and European consensus
On another important note, the EU recently faced a serious crisis over a trade agreement with the U.S., which many saw as a heavy blow to Europe with far-reaching political consequences. Trump threatened to impose 30% tariffs on European goods, but through negotiations and a series of concessions, the EU was able to bring that figure down to 15%.
The numbers are only a part of the problem. More importantly, the European Union showed weakness where its positions had seemed fairly strong, and the crisis exposed the recurring lack of unity in Europe.
It seemed that overcoming the coronavirus crisis, negotiating joint decisions on sanctions against Russia, and organizing support for Ukraine demonstrated Brussels’ ability to find a common position for all 27 countries, despite obvious difficulties. Meanwhile, by securing only a 15% gain in the tariff disputes, the EU simultaneously revealed weakness and disunity — a fact well understood by Trump, Putin, and all of Europe’s near and distant neighbors. They will take this into account going forward.
By gaining 15% in the tariff disputes with the U.S., the EU simultaneously revealed political disunity — a fact well understood by both Trump and Putin
On the eve of the Trump–Putin meeting in Alaska, European leaders issued a joint statement with Zelensky, welcoming the American president’s peace efforts and expressing a tentative concern for the fate of Ukrainian territories. While such a declaration is arguably better than none at all, it lacked the initiative, determination, and principles that European leaders had been rather liberal in proclaiming until just recently.
Now, they are actively discussing possible security guarantees for Ukraine. The situation is clearly changing, but the question remains how stable and long-term these changes will be — especially in light of Europe's reported lack of confidence in Trump’s peace initiative.
Overall, it remains a real possibility that Europe will not summon the political will to make up for America’s increasing absence when it comes to Ukraine. Such a situation creates the very real risk that, even if the worst of all possible outcomes does not materialize, all of the hemming and hawing will nevertheless lead to any future aid packages to Ukraine being less effective and arriving in a less timely manner than they otherwise would have.