The “Axis of Upheaval”
The free and democratic world has faced many challenges throughout its history. During the Second World War, the challenge was the Axis Powers. During the Cold War, it was the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union — or, as President Reagan called it, the Evil Empire.
Today, the free world faces an even bigger threat: the CRINKs. Coined one year ago by Peter Van Praagh, president of the Halifax International Security Forum, CRINKs is an acronym for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Not coincidentally, these are the primary state actor threats identified by the U.S. National Defense Strategy.
In April of this year, the Center for a New American Security came up with their own term for the CRINKs: the “Axis of Upheaval.” Regardless of which moniker you prefer, the concept remains the same: the four primary adversaries of the U.S.-backed, rules-based international order are not merely a diverse array of regional threats, but an emerging unified front. While not bound together by a formal military alliance, this does not diminish the disruptors’ ability to work together in pursuit of their similar interests.
While bilateral relations between the CRINKs are not a new development, the scale of their cooperation has significantly deepened over the past two years. Forays into multilateral partnership include the joint drill between the Russian, Iranian, and Chinese Navies earlier this year.
The clearest example of this emerging axis though, is in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia has received continuous and escalating material support from all three of its partners in crime. Munitions from Iran and North Korea, along with dual use materials from China, have helped fuel the Russian war machine.
Munitions from Iran and North Korea, along with dual use materials from China, have helped fuel the Russian war machine.
the expectation that it would need any outside assistance in order to successfully execute the “Special Military Operation,” nor did the Kremlin’s partners expect they would need to provide any. The deepening arms trade between them is in part a failure of NATO and other allied states to impose sufficient consequences after deterrence measures were visibly failing.
Following the revelation this past January that Russia had used North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine, I argued that the United States needed to act now in order to deter Russia from concluding negotiations to acquire missiles from Iran as well. To do that, the South Koreans needed to be convinced to directly supply Ukraine with lethal aid, and the U.S. should have dramatically escalated its own provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine. Neither of those steps were taken though, and unsurprisingly, Russia has now acquired Iranian ballistic missiles as well.
North Korea, already an isolated pariah state, cannot be easily influenced, but President Putin’s calculus certainly can be. If he believes that he will get away with something, he will do it. However, if his shopping trips to Pyongyang result in Ukraine getting access to the arsenals of Hanwha and Poongsan, then his deals with President Kim won’t have been worth it.
South Korea has a vested interest in stopping further arms deals between Russia and its totalitarian neighbor to the north. While Russia gets large quantities of — albeit low quality — ammunition, North Korea is seeking technology transfers in return. Both the U.S. and South Korea have raised concerns about Russia sharing additional rocket and missile technology with the Kim regime.
While Russia gets large quantities of — albeit low quality — ammunition, North Korea is seeking the transfer of rocket and missile technologies from Moscow.
Following the signing of a new security pact between Russia & North Korea in June, the South Korean government announced that it would consider providing Ukraine with lethal military aid. And yet, months later, no decision has been made. This continuous waffling only further emboldens the CRINKs to elevate their military cooperation to greater heights.
The CRINKs weaponize Western hesitation
They freely climb up the escalation ladder, while the Biden Administration, despite having a much bigger and much taller ladder of their own, agonizingly debates every small step before finally moving up a rung months after it was time to do so. The combined economic and military might of the NATO alliance and other aligned countries like South Korea, Japan, and Australia dwarfs that of the CRINKs, but that capacity simply does not matter if we are too afraid to use it.
Our fear is what they are counting on the most. They all have their own blackmail strategies to extort us. Russia and North Korea use nuclear sabre rattling, Iran has its vast network of terrorist proxies, and China has its economic dominance — which doubles as a vulnerability. Despite claiming back in February 2022 that their partnership with Russia had “no limits,” Beijing has been cautious in its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Being integrated into the global economy to a much greater extent than Russia, China is more susceptible to the effects of sanctions. This has resulted in China’s material support for its “no limits” partner being, in a word, limited — rather than providing munitions and other military supplies, which might invite more aggressive sanctions, China has stuck to sending dual use goods.
But there are signs that Beijing’s cautious policy is giving way to something more brazen. Chinese armored vehicles have turned up in Russian military service, and the effect of China’s supply of dual use goods and other sanctions evasion activities should not be underestimated.
Chinese support has been instrumental in Russia’s ability to produce its own missiles, which are filled with western components. The small number of targeted sanctions imposed by Washington on Chinese firms engaging in this illicit trade of missile components has proven to be inadequate. As with North Korea, these half measures only encourage Russia and China to further push the boundaries, and it is long past due to call their bluff.
Last month, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell seemed to take the first step towards that when he characterized Beijing’s material support as “a very substantial effort on the part of China to help sustain, build, and diversify various elements of the Russian war machine.” Campbell also disclosed what China is receiving in return from Russia.
“The capabilities that Russia is providing is support in areas where previously they had been frankly reluctant to engage directly with China. We are concerned about a particular number of military arenas where there appears to be some determination to provide China with greater support. That has to do with submarine operations, activities of aeronautical design, including stealth; that also involves capacities on missile capabilities.”
The submarine technology transfers in particular are certainly causing alarms to sound at the Pentagon. Undersea technology is the primary domain in which Russia has maintained a significant technological edge over China, and it is also where the U.S. Navy has the greatest advantage over the People's Liberation Army Navy. But since Campbell made his shocking rhetorical revelation, there has been no material escalation in sanctions policy. While the Washington has increased its military support to Taiwan, this has yet to produce any clear change in Chinese behavior.
While China has attempted to obfuscate its support for Russia, the most visible example of the CRINKs aid to Russia comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran. The now infamous Shahed drones first began terrorizing Ukrainian civilians in the autumn of 2022, and they have remained a routine threat to everyday life in the country ever since. The U.S., the United Kingdom, and France all agreed that Iran’s transfer of the drones to Russia represented violation of United Nations Security Council sanctions, but as usual, the Western powers only responded with modest additional sanctions.
Following the expiration of the remaining UN sanctions last October, Iran began negotiations to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia. Unlike the arms from North Korea, which have been of dubious quality, the Shaheds have proven to be an effective terror weapon — one capable of drawing Ukrainian air defense assets away from the front line.
Shahed drones have proven to be an effective terror weapon — one capable of drawing Ukrainian air defense assets away from the front line.
Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), while still untested in Ukraine, have proven to be effective in Iraq. In return for the drones and missiles, Iran has negotiated the acquisition of Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, and has already received Yakovlev Yak-130 advanced jet trainers.
The Su-35 is one of Russia’s most modern designs and would be a major capability upgrade for the Iranian Air Force. SRBMs for advanced fighter aircraft is a logical trade for the Iranian military, as the former have limited reach from Iranian territory, and the latter will complicate the Israeli Air Force’s operations. When Tehran might receive any Su-35s remains to be seen, but we must plan on them being delivered; Iran certainly isn’t supplying Russia free of charge.
With the window of opportunity to dissuade all of these arms deals among the CRINKs long since closed, the U.S. must impose costs as best it can. Allowing the transfers to proceed unchecked only encourages the loose alliance of rogue states to climb further up the escalation ladder. The easiest thing to do would be to hit them where it hurts by implementing real sanctions.
Allowing the transfers to proceed unchecked only encourages the loose alliance of rogue states to climb further up the escalation ladder.
Both Russia and Iran are heavily dependent on oil, gas, and petrochemical exports for government revenue, and China is a major purchaser of those exports. The current sanctions regimes are ineffective and need to be strengthened. Two good first steps would be negotiating a lower price cap on Russian oil while simultaneously fully implementing the new Iran sanctions that were passed into law as part of the April national security supplemental, as was recently requested by a bipartisan group of Congressional Representatives.
In June, President Biden announced additional sanctions on Russia, including secondary sanctions authorities for the Treasury Department, which allow them to target non-Russian financial institutions that are doing business with any sanctioned Russian entity or individual. This is the sort of sanction that Beijing has been worried about — although China has increased its trade with Russia substantially, the U.S. is still a much more important economic partner. China’s banks cannot afford being cut off from the U.S. dollar, and so the Biden Administration needs to give serious consideration to making an example out of one of these financial institutions.
Beyond these economic measures, there is an opportunity to take even more decisive action. The Israeli government has vowed to respond to Iran’s ballistic missile attack of Oct. 1. Jerusalem’s response to Iran’s first barrage back in the spring was extremely limited, but former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak speculated that this time they would launch a more significant attack on Iran’s oil industry. But back in Washington, Biden has spoken in opposition both to strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and the country’s oil industry.
This is of course perfectly in character. De-escalation has been the Biden Administration’s top foreign policy objective across all global crises. They have worked strenuously to prevent a larger war breaking out in the Middle East. As the November election approaches, the economic and subsequent political implications of a war — such as higher oil prices — only become more worrying for the President and his fellow Democrats.
The Israeli government cannot be expected to defend their country in accordance with what President Biden finds most politically expedient for himself though. The Israelis learned long ago what the Ukrainian government is now itself coming to terms with: it is better to ask for forgiveness than permission. If Israel had granted President Biden a veto over their military operations, they would not have been able to systematically dismantle the entire senior leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah.
While both Israel and Ukraine are grateful for the assistance provided to them by the United States, their security interests are fundamentally at odds with the worldview of President Biden. As he serves out his final months in office, he should consider the possibility that the biggest risk to both his own legacy and the electoral prospects of his party is not that of escalation, but the absence of U.S. leadership.
Biden can tell Israel not to strike any of Iran’s strategic assets, but the Israelis are probably going to do so anyway. Alternatively, Biden could come to an agreement with Jerusalem on a calibrated response — one that involves American assistance while furthering both countries’ strategic aims.
Israel’s ability to execute large scale air strikes against Iran is complicated by the extremely poor state of their fleet of aerial refueling tankers, which will be needed to support their fighter jets. If the President offers the logistical support of U.S. Air Force refuelers and additional munitions for Israeli fighters, then Israel may be more inclined to come to an agreement on the target set.
If President Biden offers the logistical support of U.S. Air Force refuelers and additional munitions for Israeli fighters, then Israel may be more inclined to come to an agreement on the target set.
Nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure could be taken off the list, but air bases, ballistic missile launchers, and Iran’s defense industrial base could be dealt a massive blow. Another worthwhile target would be ports on the Caspian Sea, through which Iran and Russia trade with one another. This would degrade the war fighting capacity of both Iran and Russia.
Ramping up pressure
The President should also commit to returning to a maximum economic and diplomatic pressure campaign against the current regime in Tehran. The alternative is to continue kicking the can down the road, leaving the problem to fester until it finally explodes at an even worse time for the United States — like when Chairman Xi decides to escalate even further against Taiwan.
Regardless of what course of action President Biden chooses in the Middle East, Israel will do what it feels it needs to. Ukraine, however, is still short of that level of self reliance. Kyiv possesses no nuclear deterrent to fall back on if all else fails, and so the Zelensky administration is counting on the United States, NATO, and the rest of the free world to help repel Russia’s invasion. The best way to stop Russian aggression and send a strong message to the rest of the CRINKs is to decisively defeat the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. And yet, the path to that outcome continues to get more difficult as Ukraine is forced to fight on despite insufficient quantities of military hardware and with absurd restrictions that prevent it from returning fire into Russian territory.
Much has already been written on solving the problem set outlined above, but there are other steps that can be taken to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.
One challenge is Ukraine’s lack of pilots and ground crews to fly and maintain the Ukrainian Air Force’s new fleet of used F-16s. The Ukrainian government has been asking the U.S. and other NATO members for months to increase the pace of pilot training, which President Biden finally committed to at the end of last month. But that process will still take many more months to complete.
A possible shortcut around the lengthy training period is to recruit retired pilots who already know how to fly F-16s, which is something that the Ukrainian government has also been asking for. One problem with this is that flying a fighter jet is a highly perishable skill. The U.S. Air Force aims to give its fighter pilots at least 200 training hours per year. An F-16 pilot who has been retired for even just a few years would not be able to immediately start flying combat missions against the Russian Armed Forces. Any of those pilots who are still employed commercially by the private sector would also be forfeiting their careers.
Another option would be to enter into a commercial contract with companies that provide adversary training services, which already have both pilots and ground crews on the payroll. One such firm, Top Aces, has already been contracted by the Canadian government to help train Ukrainian ground crews in Denmark. The Biden Administration has been staunchly opposed to any U.S. contractors going into Ukraine to provide defense services though. Speaking to The Insider at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference last month, Top Aces Corp. President Russ Quinn stated that his company is “completely aligned with U.S. policy.”
Thus, a move by Washington to change this policy offers a very easy step that could be taken to provide additional support to the Ukrainian war effort. It would affect not just Ukraine’s capacity to best utilize its F-16s, but would provide a boost to the country’s entire defense industrial base.
Numerous American firms are signing agreements to establish facilities in Ukraine for the maintenance and production of Western-made equipment. But the prohibition on U.S. contractors working inside Ukraine severely impacts their ability to quickly stand these projects up.
Switchblade drone manufacturer AeroVironment recently stated that they are actively lobbying the Biden Administration to change the policy so that they can streamline the process of training Ukrainians and establishing their planned Switchblade assembly facility in the country. This is essential to the long-term goal of reducing Ukraine’s dependence on foreign donations of military equipment — an aim that is unquestionably in the interest of both Ukraine and the donor countries.
In a world where Russia deploys its “private military contractors” all over Africa, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is embedded with all of their proxy groups in the Middle East, how can U.S. contractors going to Ukraine in a non-combat capacity be a bridge too far for President Biden?
The United States is still the most powerful country in the world, and NATO the most powerful alliance. The only way the CRINKs win is if we let them.