The latest ceasefire in Gaza has proven more enduring than previous iterations. In early November, the United States even took the risk of submitting a plan for the future governance of the enclave to the UN Security Council, aiming to prevent the resurgence of a terrorist quasi-state led by Hamas. Despite its many flaws, the peace plan signed on Oct. 13 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, appears to be the best option available, writes Zeev (Vladimir) Hanin, professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University. With the help of several Arab partners, Trump managed to compel Hamas to begin implementing the agreement for the first time — and, most importantly, to secure the return of those Israeli hostages who were still alive. Netanyahu, meanwhile, could not refuse his main ally, even though a prolonged war would have brought him greater political gain.
The U.S. has proposed deploying an international contingent to the Gaza Strip to train new security forces, maintain order, and demilitarize the region by removing armed groups, starting with Hamas. The Americans are thus putting forward yet another option to address a problem they have been trying to “resolve” since Donald Trump’s return to presidency.
Trump steps in
There is no doubt that it was Donald Trump’s pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — and even more importantly, on Hamas via Qatar and Egypt — that enabled the release of 25 Israeli and five foreign hostages between Jan. 19 and Mar. 18, 2025. They were exchanged for hundreds of Palestinian terrorists and others whom Israel regarded as their accomplices. Nevertheless, achieving a complete cessation of hostilities and the release of all hostages captured by Hamas during the terrorist attack of Oct. 7, 2023, proved impossible. Accusing Israel of violating the terms of the ceasefire, Hamas sabotaged its own commitments.
Angered, Trump warned the Islamists that the “gates of hell” would open against them if the hostages were not released. The U.S. also approved the resumption of Israeli military operations, announced by Netanyahu under pressure from the right-wing faction of his coalition, which opposed any deals with Hamas.
At that time, Bibi managed to convince Trump of his ability to “completely and decisively” defeat Hamas by military means, provided that the Americans granted the Israeli leadership carte blanche, along with military and financial resources and diplomatic cover.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
Netanyahu managed to convince Trump of his ability to completely defeat Hamas by military means
The military phase was significant. Yet not even months of IDF strikes on Hamas’s military infrastructure and the effective defeat of the group’s regular forces proved capable of solving the Gaza problem. Israel also carried out an effective strike on Iran in June 2025 and successfully contained Iran’s main proxy, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which Israel crushed a year earlier. And still, the Israeli government’s main objectives of the war in Gaza — the complete destruction of Hamas’s military capabilities, the return of the hostages, and the elimination of the terror group’s political and administrative authority in the enclave — were not achieved.
True, Hamas has lost its offensive capability and weapons‑making facilities. But with a network of remaining tunnels, stockpiles of ammunition, and partial control over the distribution of humanitarian aid, the group can still recruit new fighters and conduct targeted guerrilla warfare for months on end, all at the cost of Israeli lives and increased international pressure on Jerusalem.
In short, the outcome of Operation Gideon’s Chariots, launched in May 2025, and Gideon’s Chariots II, which began in September, were far from satisfactory. Both were launched in contradiction to the recommendations of the IDF General Staff, which stated that even a full occupation of Gaza would not guarantee the complete destruction of Hamas.
This did not prevent the vast majority of Israelis, as shown by regular public opinion surveys, from remaining optimistic about the prospects for victory over Hamas. In an August poll by Tel Aviv's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 66% expressed such confidence.
The government somehow needed to reconcile societal expectations and the reality of the war. The majority of Israel's military‑political cabinet appeared to believe that the return of the hostages, even at the cost of halting military operations, would create a sense of victory. This option seems to have prevailed. The Israeli government declared that the first and second Gideon’s Chariots were aimed at “forcing Hamas to end the war and release the hostages on Israel’s terms.” Once the leaders of the terrorist group accepted this, the war would immediately end, they claimed. This approach also satisfied Donald Trump.
However, the process stalled again, as the leaders of the Islamist fundamentalists in Gaza remained determined to “fight Israel to the last Palestinian.” They agreed to enter negotiations only after the complete withdrawal of all IDF units from Gaza, a condition Israel was not willing to accept.
Among other factors, Hamas’s confidence was fueled by its successes in information warfare. With the help of Qatar, Turkey, and other sponsors, the terrorist organization effectively established propagandistic engagement with the international media. Its narratives ultimately had a significant impact on public opinion and on political leaders in countries that had traditionally been partners and allies of the Jewish state. As a result, in September, several Western states began unilaterally recognizing the State of Palestine. The situation escalated to economic and cultural boycotts of Israel, including attempts to exclude Israel from European international economic agreements and programs.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
The situation escalated to economic and cultural boycotts of Israel
Even within Israel itself, on the eve of the peace agreements, an IDI study found that three‑quarters of the country’s Jewish population believed that Israel’s position on the international stage had worsened compared to before Oct. 7, 2023. Moreover, this view was held by the majority in each of the three main domestic political camps — left, centrist, and right (95%, 87%, and 69%, respectively).
What Netanyahu agreed to
An important indicator for understanding the progress of the Gaza negotiations is the domestic approval rating of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. According to the same IDI study, on the eve of the Gaza agreement, it stood at only 30% (36% among Jews and 5% among Israeli Arabs). This level of support had remained roughly stable since Oct. 7, 2023.
As experience shows, with such a rating, one cannot start a war nor bring one to an end — only continue the fighting. Apparently, this made Bibi all the more willing to acquiesce to the demands of the far‑right wing of his coalition and keep the war going. Not surprisingly, the same 57% of Israelis surveyed by INSS believed that the military‑political leadership acted more on political considerations than on strategic ones.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
With such a rating, one cannot start a war nor bring it to an end — one can only continue the fighting
However, the fact that he was suspected of prolonging the war for political gain did not seem to trouble the Israeli Prime Minister much — at least, not enough to shift policy in line with the demands of the parliamentary and civil opposition. With a stable coalition majority in the Knesset, Netanyahu preferred to buy time. He likely hoped that, over the course of the year leading up to the next parliamentary elections in 2026, public sentiment would shift in a direction more favorable to him.
It was at this moment that Trump stepped in. Netanyahu received the kind of signal from Washington that he could no longer ignore, considering that close ties with the conservative wing of the Republican Party were the cornerstone for his entire domestic and foreign policy. Refusing Trump was simply not an option.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
The negotiations were brief. On Sept. 29, the U.S. President addressed reporters after meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, announcing that his plan to end the war in the Gaza Strip — developed with the involvement of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and several Middle Eastern partners.
The 20-point plan was published the same day and formally endorsed two weeks later at the Peace Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh. Most of the points outlined general principles and sanctions in the event that Hamas rejected or failed to implement the agreed-upon terms.
In essence, the proposal boiled down to three main ideas.
- All military actions cease immediately. IDF forces withdraw to an agreed-upon line and remain there until the conditions for a gradual and complete troop withdrawal are met. The Israeli army maintains a presence along the security perimeter until Gaza is fully protected against the resurgence of any terrorist threat. Humanitarian aid begins to flow into Gaza through the UN and other international organizations in volumes at least equal to those stipulated in the Jan. 19, 2025 agreement, and work begins on restoring the enclave’s civilian infrastructure.
- A massive prisoner exchange. Within 72 hours from the signing, all Israeli hostages still in Gaza — living and deceased — shall be returned in exchange for the release from Israeli prisons of 250 terrorists serving life sentences and an additional 1,700 Gaza residents arrested after October 7, 2023.
- Demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Hamas shall be removed from power, and its fighters who willingly lay down their arms and renounce terrorism shall be granted amnesty and the option to leave the enclave. Governance of Gaza shall be entrusted to a temporary transitional authority, which shall be apolitical and technocratic. Regional partners shall provide guarantees that Hamas and other groups fulfill their obligations and that the new Gaza pose no threat to its neighbors.
The content and spirit of “Trump’s 20 Points” was a far cry from Netanyahu’s vision or the promises he had made to the right‑populist faction of his coalition. Despite friendly praise for Bibi from Trump, the era when the Israeli Prime Minister could receive a green light from the U.S. President for virtually any military decision, along with backing in his domestic political maneuvers, appears to have come to an end. In the new reality, Bibi realized that slogans and declarations could only get him so far. Ultimately, his political survival aligned with the country's interests, finally bringing an agreement within reach.
Gaza: plans for the day after tomorrow
As a result, the initiative to end the war in Gaza was taken up by Trump and his team — primarily Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. There was a certain logic to this. On the one hand, the Israeli leadership lacked unity. On the other hand, Hamas’s willingness to negotiate within the previous framework — “Israel mediated by Egypt and Qatar” — had been exhausted. It is therefore unsurprising that the plan to deploy peacekeeping forces in the Gaza Strip was submitted to the UN Security Council by the Americans, not Israel.
The White House is looking for the optimal “carrot-and-stick” balance in motivating Ankara and Doha to pressure Hamas into lowering its demands, fulfilling the second part of the agreement, and disarming. The sponsors were also expected to convey to the group’s leaders the point that their survival would only be possible under the conditions of a “new Gaza.”
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
The White House is looking for the optimal “carrot-and-stick” balance in motivating Ankara and Doha to pressure Hamas into accepting the deal
The first stage has largely been completed. Three days after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip came into effect, all 19 remaining Israeli hostages still alive were released. They had been held captive by the terrorists for 738 days. However, the “body exchange” process (stipulated at a ratio of 15 terrorist bodies returned for each deceased Israeli hostage) has been delayed. Hamas is stalling and claims it is unable to fulfill this part of its obligations within the agreed timeframe.
Trump, who had a personal stake in ensuring all parties honored their agreements, intervened on Oct. 14, demanding that Hamas immediately return the bodies of all deceased hostages. His main message was clear: the threat that “if they don’t disarm, we’ll disarm them,” and the promise that Israel would be allowed to take forceful action against the terrorists should Hamas violate the ceasefire.
According to the White House plan, the implementation of this provision falls under the mandate of the temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF), which is to operate under the aegis of the “Council of Peace” — an international body tasked with overseeing the social and economic rebuilding of the Gaza Strip.
The same “Council,” which Trump will chair alongside Tony Blair and other luminaries, will oversee the activities of the executive administrative body — a 15-member “technocratic government” unconnected to Hamas, the Palestinian National Authority, or Mahmoud Abbas's PLO in Ramallah.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
However, it remains unclear how this complicated construct, if established, is supposed to provide real security on the ground. It is hard to imagine that armed contingents from Muslim countries, especially Turkey and Qatar, would have the capacity, and most importantly, the will to restrain and disarm Hamas fighters.
It is also unclear whether Trump will be able to involve Cairo — which governed Gaza from 1948 to 1967 but never granted its residents Egyptian citizenship. Presumably, the last thing Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi would want is to deal with Gaza’s branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which Hamas essentially represents. El-Sisi earned his authority in Egypt precisely by preventing a massive influx of refugees from Gaza.
Thus, the Israeli army might still have to bear the brunt of this effort — in line with demands from both the Israeli government and many opposition leaders. The first test already came on Oct. 19, when Islamist militants attacked the IDF and were hit with a retaliatory strike. According to Israeli media, the White House and the U.S. Department of State then tried to prevent the collapse of the Gaza ceasefire agreement and the resumption of full‑scale hostilities by demanding that Israel limit itself to a “proportional response” while focusing on the isolation of Hamas.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
The Israeli army might still have to bear the brunt of the effort to disarm Hamas
Hamas, in turn, is also signaling a certain willingness to “step back,” claiming that their “resistance forces” are not targeting the Israeli military, but the so‑called “People’s Forces” of Yasser Abu Shabab — the militia of a major Bedouin clan that is opposed to Hamas and controls eastern Rafah.
If this is partly the case, the current developments should be regarded as an outcome of the “temporary security management” in Gaza granted to Hamas by Trump after the evacuation of the surviving Israeli hostages from the Strip on Oct. 13. Within just a few hours, Hamas carried out public executions of Palestinian Arabs accused of collaborating with Israel or having ties to adversarial clans.
Is the chaos in Gaza under control?
Does this mean that Gaza is already embroiled in a civil war? The empowerment of Gaza’s clan structures, which represent 72% of its population, including 608 registered mukhtars (elders) and six major Bedouin confederations, is considered by some experts to be a crucial resource for ousting Hamas and filling the governance vacuum. The surviving Hamas leaders are therefore determined to stop this trend by any means necessary, and Israel can hardly remain a bystander.
Although Hamas has no intention of laying down its arms, the group’s leaders are willing to accept a “technocratic government” as a facade offering them a path to staying in control of the Strip. Inter-Arab and international forces are unlikely to have either the motivation or the real capability to fight Hamas, serving instead as a symbolic presence similar to UNIFIL. Meanwhile, the Israeli army has both the motivation and the capability to resume operations, but it is currently restrained by the ceasefire obligations.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.
At this stage, the Israeli government, apparently heeding calls from Washington, has instructed the army to resume enforcing the ceasefire, which had been violated by Hamas. While the implementation of the agreement remains stalled, the IDF controls the buffer zone (just over 50% of the Strip’s territory), retaining the right to strike terrorist cells if security threats arise — which continues to happen periodically.
As for the “Trump plan,” it has numerous shortcomings from Israel’s perspective: a renewed emphasis on the issue of a Palestinian state, the ceding of effective control over the Strip to Turkey and Qatar, and a UN monopoly on the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza (displacing alternative structures that have proven effective).
Nevertheless, Trump's plan offers a significant advantage for Israel. After two years of war, there is hope in Israel for renewed economic growth, a reduction in the budget deficit, and the resolution of diplomatic disputes and other challenges. Perhaps this is the best that can be achieved today, but we are still a long way from an enduring end to the fighting between Israel and the Islamists of Gaza.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a UN peacekeeping force deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 425 of Mar. 19, 1978.