On August 12, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted a plea from the defense council of Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik to replace his prison sentence with a monetary fine. This is part of what is arguably the most acute crisis in the region since the end of the 1992–1995 civil war. The trigger was an attempt to remove Dodik from power. After a court sentenced him to one year in prison for failing to comply with the decisions of the international administration that has been operating in the country since the war’s end, Bosnia’s Central Election Commission annulled Dodik’s mandate. The court will continue to review appeals, and if the situation remains unchanged, early elections will be scheduled within 90 days. Dodik has vowed to block this process and refuses to leave office. Experts say he might ultimately seek refuge with one of his few allies — the leaders of Serbia, Hungary, and Russia.
Nearly three decades after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains gripped by political tension. The country has a uniquely complex structure: it consists of Republika Srpska, which makes up 49% of its territory and is populated mainly by Serbs; and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which covers 51% and is home primarily to Bosniak Muslims and Croats. This arrangement is the legacy of the Dayton Accords, signed thirty years ago.
Critics routinely describe Milorad Dodik as a Kremlin ally, noting that his policies aim to undermine the Bosnian state and obstruct its Euro-Atlantic integration. Since 2010, he has served three terms as president of Republika Srpska, and in the period between 2018 and 2022, he was a member of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency.
Experts interviewed by The Insider believe that the attempt to remove Dodik from office does not in itself pose a threat to stability — just as the court’s decision to let him pay a fine instead of serving a prison term does not shield him from a six-year ban on holding office. Still, Dodik is threatening to block early elections at the same time tensions are rising between Russia and Western countries over the region. Although the EU peacekeeping mission remains in place, its troops have not moved to arrest Dodik despite an outstanding warrant.
Disputes between the political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and both the central authorities in Sarajevo and the Office of the High Representative — the international administration — have persisted throughout the postwar period. Rarely, however, have they carried such dramatic consequences as today.
Russia, along with politicians from Republika Srpska and members of several Croatian parties, has long called for the closure of the Office of the High Representative. Muslim Bosniak political leaders, by contrast, oppose the idea — with some even urging the international administration to take a more active role. Western governments argue that it is too soon to wind down the mission, noting that the country has yet to meet the postwar settlement’s requirements, particularly when it comes to combating corruption and upholding the rule of law. They also warn that rhetoric advocating for the breakup of Bosnia poses a genuine threat to peace.
It is worth noting that Milorad Dodik was initially seen by Western diplomats as a stabilizing figure. Clinton-era U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once called him “a breath of fresh air.” Over time, however, the dynamics of domestic power struggles turned Dodik into a frequent guest at the Kremlin — and an open admirer of Vladimir Putin. Dodik continued visiting Putin even after 2022.
In the past decade, Dodik’s political course has come to be associated with attempts to dismantle the Bosnian state: from paralyzing government institutions and refusing to recognize Bosnia’s courts and prosecutors, to threatening withdrawal from agreements providing for a unified army and intelligence services. He has repeatedly brandished the prospect of a referendum on Republika Srpska’s independence — despite the fact that the Dayton Accords, which define the country’s postwar framework, make no provision for such a move.
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).
Over the past decade, Dodik’s political approach has been defined largely by efforts to unravel the Bosnian state
Since the end of the war, the Office of the High Representative has issued hundreds of decisions on matters that the local authorities failed to resolve — from property disputes and the return of refugees to Bosnia’s state symbols, citizenship laws, election rules, and the structure of the Council of Ministers. The Office has also dismissed around 140 officials, including judges, ministers, civil servants, and members of parliament. Most of these removals took place in the 1990s and early 2000s, after which the international administration made far less frequent use of its special powers.
However, tensions flared again in 2021 when German diplomat Christian Schmidt assumed the post of High Representative. Backed by China, Russia pushed in the UN Security Council to shut down the international administration overseeing implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia. Moscow and Beijing agreed to support Schmidt’s appointment only in exchange for ending the Office of the High Representative’s mandate — possibly as early as 2022. They also demanded that he be stripped immediately of his special powers, including the authority to issue binding decisions and remove officials and judges without the right of appeal.
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).
Appointments to the post of High Representative are made by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Alongside Russia, its members include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the country holding the EU presidency, the European Commission, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (represented by Turkey). Selecting a new High Representative is essentially a compromise among the key players. The role has so far always gone to diplomats from EU member states, with Americans serving as their deputies. Russia was the only country on the Steering Board to oppose Schmidt’s candidacy, and in the UN it was joined only by China — which is not involved in the Bosnian peace process.
Although Moscow and Beijing failed in their bid to shut down the international administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the effort gave Dodik fresh momentum. Since Schmidt’s arrival, he has kept up a steady stream of taunts and insults, at one point even vowing to put the UN official on trial as an “impostor.”
The conflict has now reached the point where Dodik is facing serious consequences. In February 2025, a Bosnian court sentenced him to one year in prison and barred him from holding public office for six years. In response, the leader of the local Serbs launched a campaign to rally his supporters.
“Dodik is the dominant figure in Republika Srpska and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You may love him or hate him, but he has imposed himself as one of the key players,” political commentator and psychologist Srđan Puhalo told The Insider. According to Puhalo, Dodik currently controls virtually everything in Republika Srpska and has many loyal allies in the presidency and the Council of Ministers.
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).
«Dodik is the dominant figure in Republika Srpska and in Bosnia and Herzegovina»
He is one of the key players and a highly pragmatic politician, says The Insider’s interlocutor. “He may appear tough, but in reality he treats politics as a marketplace and is always ready to bargain. Principles and convictions matter little to him. I believe that even now he is negotiating and striking deals,” Puhalo asserts.
The fluidity of Dodik’s principles is evident in the fact that he ultimately appeared before the Bosnian court, despite years of declaring he did not recognize the body’s authority. “Even players like him eventually overplay their hand: in the end, we have a court ruling that Dodik refuses to acknowledge, yet he still asked to have his prison sentence replaced with a fine,” noted Puhalo, who says Republika Srpska is mired in chaos. At Dodik’s behest, its parliament has passed laws overturning the High Representative’s decisions, leaving it unclear which laws are in force and which are not, which institutions are legitimate and which are not — and even whether the appointment of the High Representative is actually legal.
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).
Dodik refuses to acknowledge a court ruling, yet he still asked to have his prison sentence replaced with a fine
“Dodik’s opponents argue that the decisions of state institutions must be enforced, yet we have seen no serious attempt by those institutions to arrest him. Moreover, the law does not specify who can replace the president of Republika Srpska if his mandate is terminated. It is currently unclear who will run in the early elections — and equally unclear what steps the international community is prepared to take in this crisis,” the expert notes.
Husnija Kamberović, a professor in the Philosophy department at the University of Sarajevo, believes the political crisis will drag on for a long time — but says it could also create space for political forces capable of preserving peace and keeping dialogue alive.
“The political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina is becoming increasingly serious, as it has morphed into a security crisis. However, the threat is now lower than it was three months ago, and the likelihood of conflict is less obvious,” Kamberović told The Insider. “By appearing before the Bosnian court, he effectively acknowledged the legitimacy of what he had long denounced as illegal. This may be part of some agreement we know nothing about, but much points to the fact that Dodik is on his way into the political past,” Kamberović added.
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).
“Bosnia and Herzegovina — however weak it may be as a state — still functions. As political opposition in Republika Srpska gains strength, the conditions for dialogue will gradually emerge — a dialogue that is impossible under Dodik’s policies. His arrogance may have populist appeal, but it is politically unsustainable,” Kamberović believes.
In the early 2000s, Russia showed little interest in the region, pulling its small contingent of peacekeepers out of the Balkans in 2003 to focus on diplomacy and energy projects. In line with this approach, Moscow has never been among Bosnia’s major financial donors.
Topping that list are the EU, the United States, and Japan, which together have provided Bosnia with €6 billion in postwar assistance — spanning humanitarian aid, reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, economic projects, and education. These same countries cover the cost of the High Representative’s work: the EU pays 54%, the U.S. 22%, and Japan 10%. Russia’s contribution is roughly 1%.
In recent years, Moscow has not supported a single joint statement by the Peace Implementation Council — this despite the fact that each one of them reaffirms Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and condemns separatist and nationalist rhetoric.
In recent days, Russian diplomacy has stepped up its activity in the Balkans. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova denounced Dodik’s prison sentence as absurd, portraying him as a man supposedly fighting Western neocolonialism. On August 7, consultations were held at the UN Security Council, where Russia’s deputy permanent representative Dmitry Polyanskiy claimed that the prosecution of Dodik posed a threat to the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Observers have also noted an unusually blunt, almost threatening statement from the Russian Embassy in Sarajevo, warning that the Balkans risk once again becoming Europe’s powder keg.
In response, Bosnia’s Foreign Ministry sent letters to five Western countries — the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy — warning of “serious threats emanating from Russia.” Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković cautioned that the Kremlin is questioning “the very existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single state,” calling it “the most acute and concentrated threat the country faces today.” “We know that Russia operates not only through political means. It is prepared to engage in espionage, cyberattacks, and disinformation,” the minister said.
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).
The Kremlin is questioning “the very existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single state,” maintains the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Elmedin Konaković
In Moscow, Christian Schmidt is openly branded a “usurper” and a “useful idiot for Berlin and London” — insults that carefully avoid any mention of the United States. But in reality, such sharp rhetoric aimed at Schmidt is a jab at the countries with the most influence in the Balkans — namely the U.S. and EU member states — which provide the bulk of the resources for peacebuilding and reconstruction.
Apart from Russia, Dodik has long enjoyed unwavering support from Serbia and Hungary. Although the president of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina has no formal authority over foreign policy, he has cultivated close ties with the leadership of both countries during his years in power. After the verdict, Dodik traveled to Budapest to meet with Viktor Orbán. The Hungarian prime minister backed him, writing on social media that Dodik had been “convicted for refusing to march to Brussels’ drum.” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, for his part, claimed that the Bosnian court’s ruling was aimed “against the entire Serbian people.”
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).
«Dodik had been convicted for refusing to march to Brussels’ drum,” writes Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán
Many observers still doubt that foreign politicians can offer Dodik any meaningful help, and Husnija Kamberović believes the Kremlin may soon have to look for new allies in the Balkans. “As a great power, Russia seeks ways to expand its influence and mobilizes certain political structures. But Dodik’s track record shows he is not a fully reliable or loyal political partner,” Kamberović says. He recalls that Dodik rose to power with Western backing before switching sides: “This speaks more to the success of Russia’s policy of recruiting allies on the ground than to the results of Milorad Dodik’s own political activity.” Moreover, developments elsewhere — such as in Syria — show that Russia ultimately prioritizes its own interests over those of its allies. “If the Kremlin can do without Assad in Syria, why wouldn’t it be able to dispense with Dodik?” Kamberović asks.
Orbán’s role in this case is limited. “In the European Union, Dodik is seen as part of the problem, not part of the solution. Orbán can block the adoption of a unanimous EU statement, but when it comes to sanctions against Dodik, each country makes its own decision,” says Srđan Puhalo. Dodik’s closest ties are with the Serbian authorities, yet Puhalo doubts that President Aleksandar Vučić — who is grappling with a serious political crisis at home — would risk a confrontation with Western capitals over the issue of Dodik’s political career. According to Puhalo, saving Dodik is not among Moscow’s top priorities given the current international agenda. It is therefore possible, he believes, that the president of Republika Srpska may ultimately have to consider simply relocating to Russia.
The Bosnian War — fought from 1992 to 1995 with the involvement of neighboring Serbia and Croatia, and later NATO forces and international peacekeepers — was a direct consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The conflict pitted the region’s three main communities against one another. Under international pressure, the Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats (Catholic) eventually agreed to form a federation. The peace deal established a single state — effectively a loose confederation of Republika Srpska and the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, are named after the U.S. Air Force’s Wright–Patterson base in Dayton, Ohio, where negotiations took place from November 1-21, 1995. The final agreement was signed in Paris by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (representing the Bosniaks), Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (representing the Serbs), and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (representing the Croats).