New “peace plan” offers Ukraine almost no concessions compared with Istanbul draft, but adds multiple new demands

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks during a meeting in the East Room of the White House on Monday, Aug. 18, 2025, in Washington, as UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, France’s President Emmanuel Macron and President Donald Trump listen in the background. Photo: Alex Brandon / AP Photo

The Insider has reviewed and compared the draft documents from the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations with a new 28-point plan jointly developed by Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Vladimir Putin’s adviser Kirill Dmitriev, published by Reuters on Nov. 21. The comparison shows that the new plan offers Ukraine almost no concessions beyond what was already in the Istanbul draft, while adding dozens of new demands and benefits for Russia.

According to reports published earlier this week, the plan was drafted during secret talks between Witkoff and Dmitriev, who heads the Russian Direct Investment Fund. Trump said Friday that he is giving Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky until Nov. 27 to sign the documents. According to The Washington Post, U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll delivered the written plan to Zelensky on Thursday, presenting it as an ultimatum: sign it by Thanksgiving or lose U.S. support. In an address to the nation on Friday, Zelenskyy said he would discuss the plan with Kyiv’s international partners without surrendering Ukraine’s interests. However, he acknowledged that his country faces a choice between “the loss of our dignity or the risk of losing a key partner.”

What remains unchanged from April 2022

The analysis shows that Russia has preserved all of its major demands from the Istanbul framework:

• Ukrainian neutrality and renunciation of NATO accession: Ukraine would again be required to enshrine in its Constitution non-membership in the alliance.
• Ban on foreign military bases: retained in the form of “NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine.”
• Non-nuclear status: Ukraine remains a non-nuclear state under the NPT.
• Protection of the Russian language: the requirement is preserved and expanded.

Where the new plan grants Russia more than Istanbul did

The new plan contains a wide range of provisions favorable to Moscow that were absent in April 2022:

Territorial gains:

• Crimea, the entire Luhansk Region (almost completely captured by Russian forces), and the entire Donetsk Region are recognized as de facto Russian territories.
• Ukrainian forces must leave the part of the Donetsk Region under their control (including Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, and other cities); the area will become a “neutral” demilitarized buffer zone, but for some reason will be internationally recognized as Russian territory.
• The Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are to be divided along the current front line.
• In Istanbul, discussions focused only on excluding occupied areas from being covered by outside security guarantees; the new plan calls for international recognition.

Economic benefits:

• Gradual lifting of all sanctions.
• Russia’s return to the G8.
• A long-term U.S.-Russia economic agreement covering energy, resources, artificial intelligence and Arctic development.
• Use of $100 billion in frozen Russian assets for U.S. investment in Ukraine’s reconstruction (with the U.S. receiving 50% of the profits) and creation of a joint U.S.-Russian fund using remaining frozen assets for unspecified investment projects.
• Control over 50% of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’s energy output under IAEA oversight.

Political and legal guarantees:

• Full amnesty for all participants in the war.
• A comprehensive non-aggression pact among Russia, Ukraine, and Europe, with all “ambiguities” of the past 30 years considered resolved.
• Russia-NATO dialogue on security issues moderated by the United States.
• National elections in Ukraine within 100 days of signing the agreement.
• Exchange of all prisoners on an “all for all” basis, including the return of children.

Humanitarian provisions:

• Educational programs on “tolerance” and against “Nazism” in both countries.
• Protection of Russian-language media and Russian-language education in Ukraine.
• Guarantees of free use of the Dnipro River for Russian shipping and grain exports.

What U.S. “security guarantees” actually mean

According to Point 10 of the new agreements, Kyiv is given American guarantees against Russian attack:

• The United States requires compensation for these guarantees. Washington would receive payment from Ukraine for providing them with promises of defense (the amount is not specified).
• A “military response” without specifics. In the event of a Russian attack, the United States promises only a “reliable, coordinated military response,” without clarifying what that means (weapons deliveries, direct military involvement or something else).
• Conditions for the automatic cancellation of the guarantees. If Ukraine attacks Russia, the guarantees are annulled; if a “Ukrainian missile” strikes Moscow or St. Petersburg, the guarantees are canceled; thus, virtually any disputed incident could be interpreted as grounds for refusing to fulfill the agreement’s obligations.
• Sanctions as the most explicit tool. Point 10 also states that sanctions and recognition of Russia’s territorial acquisitions would be restored or revoked in the event of a new Russian attack on Ukraine.

For comparison: the Istanbul agreements envisioned multilateral guarantees from the U.S., China, Russia, France, the UK, Turkey, and Belarus, with collective responsibility. The new plan, on the other hand, obligates Ukraine to pay the U.S. for coordinating the guarantor states, with numerous caveats.

Where Russia has made concessions

The only significant concession is an increase in the permitted size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine — to 600,000 troops. In the Istanbul draft, Ukraine proposed a limit of 250,000, while Russia insisted on 85,000 (the sides apparently never agreed on a final number).

At the same time, detailed restrictions on armaments, which were a key part of the Istanbul agreements, have disappeared entirely:

• A limit of 800 tanks (Russia proposed 342).
• A limit of 2,400 infantry fighting vehicles (Russia proposed 1,029).
• Restrictions on artillery by caliber.
• A limit of 160 combat aircraft.
• A ban on missiles with a range of more than 280 kilometers.
• A ban on military exercises within 50 kilometers of the borders.

What Ukraine receives

Instead of multilateral security guarantees from six states, the new plan offers:

• The right to join the European Union (which was not discussed in Istanbul, though Russian officials have repeatedly emphasized that they do not oppose Ukraine’s EU membership).
• Preferential access to the European market (the mechanism for this is not described).
• A reconstruction package for Ukraine funded by frozen Russian assets and European resources.

Oversight

Instead of a joint commission of guarantor states, as envisioned in Istanbul, the new plan creates a “Peace Council” chaired personally by Donald Trump, who would have the power to impose sanctions for violations.

Who drafted the plan

Witkoff and Dmitriev are non-specialists with no experience in international negotiations of this scale. Witkoff is a billionaire real-estate developer and Trump associate who works without pay and flies to talks on a private jet. Dmitriev, a Stanford and Harvard graduate who began his career at the management consulting firm McKinsey & Company, proposed approaching the negotiations through the lens of business interests.

Western diplomats describe Witkoff as unprofessional: his team includes no Russia experts, and he dispensed with stenographers, relying instead on Kremlin interpreters during his meetings with Putin.

Conclusion

A comparative analysis shows that the new plan effectively legitimizes all of Russia’s territorial seizures, including some areas Moscow does not currently control. Russia would gain the entire Donetsk Region, including the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, and would benefit from the lifting of sanctions and other economic benefits that were not included even in the more favorable Istanbul proposals. Ukraine, meanwhile, would not receive meaningful security guarantees — only conditional U.S. assurances that require compensation and include numerous grounds for cancellation.