With less than a month left before Germany’s early elections on Feb. 23, the country’s more extremist political elements have decided to improve their chances by making some radical changes. In the race to the Bundestag, the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has chosen as its leader Alice Weidel, a politician who opposes immigration and same-sex marriage while herself maintaining a same-sex relationship with a migrant woman. Weidel is a worthy rival to ultra-leftist Sahra Wagenknecht, leader of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) — Germany’s political sensation in 2024. This duo of radical opponents is likely to seriously shake up the electoral results of Germany’s mainstream parties.
Women have been dominating German politics for a while. Long gone is the era of all-male presidiums and governments. Angela Merkel led the government for 16 years on behalf of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Annalena Baerbock heads the Foreign Ministry. Nancy Faeser runs the Interior Ministry. And Social Democrat Bärbel Bas chairs the Bundestag.
Democratic parties often make a point of maintaining gender parity on electoral lists. However, women have previously been virtually absent from the radical flanks of German politics. Until recently, the leadership of all ultra-radical projects — such as the National Democrats, the Republicans, and the German People's Union — was exclusively male. This backdrop renders the phenomenon of Sahra Wagenknecht and Alice Weidel even more interesting. The leaders of two radical parties from opposing ends of the political spectrum — the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) and Alternative for Germany (AfD) — are competing with mainstream political forces, and with each other, for the position of chancellor.
The BSW is Wagenknecht's fourth party. In 1991, as a member of East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), Wagenknecht joined the presidium of a new project: the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), a vehicle assembled to ensure political survival for post-communists in a unified Germany.
Gregor Gysi, one of the PDS's most respected leaders, recalls that Wagenknecht, despite her relative youth at the time, held “conservative, rather than modern, views.” In the PDS, and later in the ranks of the leftist heirs of the Democratic Socialists, Wagenknecht held key positions in the most orthodox intra-party factions, recognized by Germany’s security services as left-extremist. Her groups advocated the dismantling of capitalism as a political-economic model and the dissolution of NATO and the Bundeswehr. Wagenknecht called herself a “communist and Marxist” and lauded East Germany as “the most peace-loving and humane society,” breaking many a political taboo of the newly united Germany.
Even in unified Germany, Wagenknecht called herself a “communist and Marxist” and lauded East Germany as “the most peace-loving and humane society”
The Left rose to prominence in the 2000s and 2010s, winning seats in state parliaments, the Bundestag, and the European Parliament while participating in ruling coalitions. However, as the party came closer to the German political mainstream, its ultra-left elements grew increasingly marginalized. The leadership looked to build a positive image of a respectable and constructive left-wing force in order to attract a broad electorate, including a share of social democratic voters. Therefore, “anti-capitalist communists” were carefully relegated to third-rate roles, and their presence on the electoral lists and in the party's governing bodies was rapidly diminishing.
But none of that applied to Wagenknecht. In 2004, she received a MEP mandate. Five years later, she joined the Bundestag, then became deputy chair of the Left and co-chaired the parliamentary faction. Until 2017, Wagenknecht held the informal but important title of parliamentary opposition leader. The secret of Wagenknecht's success lay both in her connections (her husband, Oskar Lafontaine, served as finance minister in Gerhard Schröder's SPD government before founding The Left) and in her ability to play on the party “chessboard” by recruiting the right allies while strategically discrediting opponents.
She built an image of an “uncompromising leftist” willing to go against her own party “for the sake of conviction.” When the going got tough for The Left, Wagenknecht began to consider launching an independent project. While her first experiment, the Aufstehen (“Stand Up!”) platform in 2018, was not particularly successful, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), registered in 2024, immediately gained a foothold.
Alice Weidel's political trajectory has been profoundly different. She had to make a career in a pre-existing and very prominent party — the right-wing AfD. Until 2017, her name was hardly familiar to the average German, even one interested in politics. A doctor of economics, Weidel worked in her degree field in the AfD, heading the Euro and Currency group and contributing to the economic element of election campaigns.
Her first attempts to gain political weight within the party were unsuccessful. Formally a member of the federal board, she was nevertheless lacking influence and supporters and lost her nomination in the 2016-2017 Baden-Württemberg Landtag election, along with the race for the state party chairperson post.
However, Weidel’s stardom was just around the corner. Already in 2017, AfD members were plotting a coup against chairwoman Frauke Petry and her husband, prominent MEP Marcus Pretzell. The conspirators needed a new face to represent the AfD's economic bloc. A previous putsch in 2015 ended with the resignation of the party's co-founder, Hamburg University professor Bernd Lucke, who took several supporters along with him, thinning the party’s upper ranks. The choice fell on Weidel, who in 2017 joined another AfD co-founder, Alexander Gauland, at the top of the list in the parliamentary elections.
The bet paid off. The AfD won the sympathies of voters who were dissatisfied with the financial policy of Merkel's government but reluctant to vote for a “textbook” right-wing extremist. With 12.6% of the vote, it became the first right-wing party to enter the Bundestag since 1952.
A parliamentary mandate made it easier for Weidel to build her own network within the party. Realizing that the support of the far-right was key to reaching political success in the AfD, she forged an alliance in 2019 with the Institute for State Policy, the main think tank of the New Right movement, which unites party-affiliated and independent radicals.
In 2020, Weidel reached out to Björn Höcke — perhaps the most odious right-wing extremist politician in Germany — and sided with him in a conflict with “moderate” party co-chair Jörg Meuthen. Her strategy succeeded. Weidel first headed the AfD's state organization in Baden-Württemberg (her previously victorious rival had left the party, calling the leadership “idiots”), headed the party list again for the 2021 elections, and finally won two key positions: party co-chair and faction co-chair.
Wagenknecht and Weidel have both demonstrated success in party building and grassroots efforts. Paradoxically, despite their positions at opposite ends of the political spectrum, they also share a portion of the electorate. Wagenknecht played a key role in two parties before heading BSW and wedged her party into three East German Landtags — only nine months after its registration, BSW showed double-digit results ranging from 11.8% in Saxony to 15.8% in Thuringia.
Wagenknecht led her party into three state parliaments nine months after its founding
In December 2024, the first coalition involving the BSW was formed in Brandenburg. Earlier, in May 2024, the BSW won 6.2% in the European Parliament elections, and this past summer, Wagenknecht’s supporters won dozens of mandates in municipal elections in Thuringia, Saxony, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, even though local party cells had not been fully formed.
Wagenknecht managed to recruit several key federal and state politicians of The Left and effectively destroyed the older left-wing party's structures in multiple regions where it once dominated the electoral segment left of the Social Democrats. The BSW's approval rating dropped at the end of the year, but even with the current 5.2% in the latest polls, the party has a good chance of making it to the Bundestag.
There is no denying Weidel's success either. In 2021-2022, the right-wing radicals were going through a rough patch, with the party shaken by internal turmoil. As a result, the AfD performed poorly in the 2021 elections, receiving 10.3% of the vote — noticeably less than four years earlier. Their representation in the Bundestag was reduced by 11 seats. At the state level, local cells were broken up, giving way to “alternative structures,” which cost the party representation in the Bremen parliament, for one. In the first half of 2022, the radicals' ratings fluctuated between 11% and 13%.
But things changed after Weidel took over the party leadership in June 2022. By the beginning of 2024, the AfD had expanded its membership by 37%. Her new duo with AfD co-chair Tino Chrupalla consolidated the party apparatus, strengthened the power vertical and connections with local organizations, and boosted the party's approval rating.
In the year and a half since Weidel's arrival, the AfD expanded its membership by 37%
In 2023 and 2024, polls predicted AfD's results as ranging between 16% and 22%. The party now enjoys the confidence of 19-21% of voters and is contending for second place in the February elections. Of course, the co-chairs cannot take all the credit for the AfD's victories, as the overall domestic and international setting largely facilitates the growing popularity of the ultra-right. In the current circumstances, parties that present the image of an “effective manager” have the highest chances of winning over voters.
One might expect the far left and far right to be consistently antagonistic. However, Wagenknecht and Weidel converge on several foreign and domestic policy issues. Both rely on populism, criticizing multiculturalism as being harmful to Germany and advocating for stricter limits on migration. Both have strong reservations about state democratic institutions, exploiting the cliches of “old parties” and “the system” while appealing to voters disillusioned with mainstream German politicians. And both are uninterested in the green transition, in funding for environmental projects, and in restrictions on non-renewable energy sources — each has proposed encouraging the production of vehicles with internal combustion engines rather than electric cars.
The EU and the euro — an “extra burden” for Germany — serve as a constant object of criticism for the radical party leaders, who conspicuously avoid mentioning the obvious financial advantages of a common economic and monetary space. Not long ago, Wagenknecht's and Weidel's claims that the unemployed are “abusing welfare benefits” seemed radical. But today, the main viable candidate for chancellor, Christian Democrat leader Friedrich Merz, has resorted to virtually the same rhetoric.
The difference between Merz and his rivals on the right and left fringes remains their attitude toward Russia's war against Ukraine. Here, the AfD and BSW leaders also demonstrate striking unity: sympathizing with the Kremlin regime, they propose a “diplomatic solution” without taking Ukraine's interests into account. They also call for an end to military aid to Kyiv, a phased lifting of sanctions against Moscow, and Germany’s resumption of Russian energy purchases.
Wagenknecht and Weidel propose a “diplomatic solution” without taking Ukraine's interests into account, an end to military aid to Kyiv, and a lifting of sanctions against Moscow
Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the two. First, while Wagenknecht deliberately stakes out the most radical permissible positions, Weidel plays the role of a “moderate alternative” to her far-right party mates, a professional politician and economist who, unlike her “intransigent” colleagues, is ready to make certain concessions — for example, on recognizing sexual diversity, or acquiescing to Germany's EU membership.
Wagenknecht bets on radicalism, while Weidel plays the role of a “moderate alternative”
Second, while the BSW is a typical one-woman show, the AfD brings together multiple influential groups and political figures, seeking to win voters with slogans rather than personalities. As a result, Weidel's photo is only featured on one of the 12 main types of AfD campaign posters, while Wagenknecht looks at voters from every sample of the Alliance campaign materials.
Finally, the intra-party positions of the two leaders are also different. The BSW is Wagenknecht's personal endeavor, her brainchild, and the fulfillment of her ambition. Even if her party is renamed, her leadership will remain uncontested. Weidel's position in the AfD is not so stable. The party is famous for internal coups and leadership reshuffling. Despite their temporary alliance with Weidel, the far-right AfD factions may at any moment try to get rid of a politician they consider insufficiently radical.
To some extent, Weidel and Wagenknecht both compete for the votes of the “undecided, disaffected, and disillusioned” — those willing to bet on straightforward, populist solutions. However, an analysis of the transfer of votes from different parties to the BSW in last year's elections to the European Parliament shows that the party did not steal support from the AfD. The right-wing movement ranked second-to-last on the list of parties that lost voters to the BSW — below the Social Democrats, The Left, the Conservatives, and even the Liberals.
So what are the electoral prospects for the two radical parties? The AfD is guaranteed representation in the next Bundestag and will likely add mandates to its current count of 76. Meanwhile, Wagenknecht's supporters have a good chance of parliamentary representation, with the faction comparable in size to the former Left: 38 seats, according to recent polls.
That said, Wagenknecht and Weidel have equally distant chances of joining whatever future ruling coalition forms following the election. The leaders in the electoral race, the Christian Democrats, are reluctant to enter into a coalition with the AfD or the BSW, as are the other centrist parties that still represent most of the electorate. If any of Wagenknecht’s and Weidel’s proposals are actually implemented — on immigration, for example — it will be Merz and the Christian Democrats doing the work, while the AfD and BSW look on from their inevitable places in the opposition.