“Everything is going successfully, even better than we expected,” Donald Trump said on March 27, commenting on the U.S. operation against Yemen’s Houthi rebels. According to the president, the group now wants “to negotiate peace.” With Bashar al-Assad’s army in Syria defeated and Hamas and Hezbollah facing strategic setbacks, the Houthis were the only Iranian proxy that hadn’t been weakened — on the contrary, they had been gaining strength and influence. It looks like the U.S. strikes against their positions were intended as a message to Iran, which backs the Houthis, and this may well be just the opening move in a much bigger confrontation. If Washington does get drawn into a wider conflict with the Islamic Republic, the Houthis could prove to be an even bigger threat than Iran’s regular army.
In the fall of 2024, Yemeni government forces intercepted a vessel in the Red Sea carrying a shipment meant for the Houthis. The small boat, sailing under an unidentified flag, was loaded with weapons, along with parts for assembling more. Among the items were hydrogen fuel cells — essentially batteries that generate power by combining hydrogen with oxygen from the air.
These fuel cells had been adapted for use in small kamikaze drones, which the Houthis rely on heavily to attack enemy positions and ships in the Red Sea. At the moment, those drones are still powered by internal combustion engines, giving them a range of about a thousand kilometers. Using fuel cells would allow the drones to cover at least twice the distance.
Transitioning away from combustion engines would also render Houthi drones far less detectable by air defense systems and anti-drone units. The former typically rely on the heat signature of a flying object for targeting, and hydrogen-oxygen reactions generate far less heat than the engines currently in use. Anti-drone units, for their part, often use sound to locate their targets, but a drone powered by a hydrogen fuel cell is much quieter than one running on fossil fuels.
In other words, the Houthis have acquired a powerful long-range weapon that is also well-protected against interception. It’s possible they will try to transition their more advanced and dangerous drones — which are already capable of traveling thousands of kilometers with their current internal combustion engines — to hydrogen power as well. What’s more, this can rightfully be called a Houthi-developed weapon, even if it was built using technology, equipment, and ready-made systems supplied to them by Iran — the Houthis’ main sponsor.
Tehran and the Yemeni rebels, who call themselves Ansar Allah but are known worldwide as the Houthis, share religious ties. While the Houthis follow a branch of Shiite Islam that differs significantly from Iran’s dominant sect, it still falls within the broader Shiite tradition. They are also united by a deep-seated hostility and suspicion toward the wealthy Sunni states of the region.
Iran and the Houthis both adhere to Shiite Islam and are hostile toward the wealthy Sunni states of the region
Iran began sending significant quantities of weaponry to Yemen when these wealthy Sunni countries entered the war against the Houthis. In 2015, a group led by Saudi Arabia began backing the internationally recognized Yemeni government, which had been driven from its own capital by Houthi rebels. What was meant to be a quick and victorious war for the Arab coalition — and for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who was almost personally responsible for forming it — turned into a prolonged and bloody quagmire.
Despite overwhelming superiority in both numbers and quality of military equipment, the coalition never achieved any meaningful victories. It is no exaggeration to say that the war has been lost.
One of the key factors behind the rebels’ success is their exceptional adaptability. By conventional military standards, they were long seen — probably even by Saudi generals — as little more than a guerrilla movement. But the Houthis are no longer mere insurgents. They have evolved into a formidable force that controls roughly half of Yemen’s territory, including the capital and several key ports. They issue their own currency, manage their own budget, and wield enough influence that even major international organizations are forced to take them seriously.
The Houthis are no longer just a guerrilla force — they have become a powerful entity controlling half of Yemen’s territory, including the capital
This transformation is also a result of their ability to adapt to an ever-changing situation. Unbound by any international commitments, they acquire weapons and equipment not only from Iran but also from other rogue states like North Korea and Russia. Additionally, according to analysts from Israel, which sees the Houthis as an enemy, China may be supplying not only dual-use goods — such as the previously mentioned hydrogen fuel cells — but also weaponry.
Within Yemen itself, the Houthis have established systems for assembling and upgrading imported weapons. They even claim to have mastered the full production cycle of supersonic ballistic missiles. Their manufacturing sites and storage facilities are so widely dispersed across Houthi-controlled territory, and their logistics are so well concealed, that U.S. intelligence officials regularly — albeit anonymously — admit they have only a vague understanding of the actual scale of the rebels' weapons industry, meaning they cannot have a clear idea of how effective U.S. airstrikes in the country have been.
Those weapons have been responsible for several attacks of global significance. The Houthis were among the pioneers in the use of unmanned systems in real combat. In 2019, their drones caused significant damage to Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, despite the sites being protected by Patriot air defense systems. Two years earlier, a remote-controlled boat packed with explosives targeted a Saudi frigate in the Red Sea.
The extensive use of drones is a key element of Houthi combat tactics. They use drones to track enemy ship movements and launch attacks. At the same time, their strike teams operate both on land and at sea, constantly changing positions, making them difficult to detect. These mobile units have been responsible for numerous attacks on foreign vessels, including assaults on U.S. warships.
Although the attacks on the U.S. Navy were repelled, American officials acknowledge that the Houthis operated with remarkable efficiency. The only reason U.S. ships avoided damage was thanks to their use of interceptor missiles — which cost hundreds of thousands of dollars each — to destroy drones that were dozens or even hundreds of times cheaper.
Houthi tactics have been so notable that the U.S. Marine Corps is studying them closely. In fact, the USMC’s semi-official publication has openly stated that lessons learned in the Red Sea are informing the way the U.S. military may need to approach a potential future war against China’s armed forces.
During Joe Biden’s presidency, the U.S. officially removed Ansar Allah from its list of terrorist organizations, primarily for humanitarian reasons. The Houthis control territory that is home to millions of people who are suffering from years of war, and many of them lack access not only to medicine but even to clean drinking water.
Recognizing the Houthis as terrorists complicated the work of Western aid organizations and charities, prompting a reassessment of their status. However, when Donald Trump returned to the White House, he reinstated Ansar Allah on the terrorist list and ordered the military to prepare an operation against them. After taking office on January 20, Trump wasted no time — his directive labeling the Houthis as terrorists is dated January 22.
Given Trump’s unpredictability, his tendency to seek simple solutions to complex problems, and his stated desire to be remembered as a peacemaker, it is possible the American president sees this confrontation as an opportunity for a quick, low-risk, and victorious war — one he could present to the world as a major achievement. However, the operation against the Houthis, already marred by controversy after a journalist was mistakenly added to a secret war-planning chat, may have deeper motives.
Ansar Allah is the only faction within Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance that has not lost influence over the past year — in fact, it has actually strengthened its position. The main pro-Iranian ally in the Middle East, Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, has collapsed. Hamas has been forced into a defensive position since the war in Gaza began, losing nearly all of its military leadership. Hezbollah in Lebanon has been severely weakened by Israeli intelligence operations, which remotely disabled thousands of the group’s encrypted pagers, while Israeli airstrikes have decimated its arsenals. In addition, Syria’s new government is no longer preventing its citizens from crossing into Lebanon to take up arms against Hezbollah in retaliation for its years of support for Assad. Meanwhile, Iran has done little to aid any of these allies, leaving them to deal with their crises alone.
As Iran’s other regional allies see their capabilities degraded, the Houthis have not only avoided significant territorial, personnel, or reputational losses, but have actually improved their standing. Continuous scandals involving officials from Yemen’s internationally recognized government make it all but certain that the Houthis’ domestic opponents will not have the strength or political will to launch a large-scale offensive against them anytime soon. At the same time, Houthi popularity in the Islamic world has grown significantly following their series of missile and drone strikes on Israel — a country still widely resented across much of the Muslim world.
Houthi popularity in the Islamic world has grown significantly following their series of missile and drone strikes on Israel
While Hezbollah and Hamas saw their rocket stockpiles depleted by Israeli strikes, the Houthis continued refining their existing arsenals and may have even been developing their own weapon systems. If the U.S. enters a full-scale war with Iran, the Houthis could pose as much of a threat to American forces as the regular army of the Islamic Republic. Such a conflict is far from unimaginable. Trump is pressuring Iran towards signing a new nuclear deal, resorting to what some describe as outright blackmail. He personally stated that he sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warning that if no agreement is reached, Tehran will face unspecified “consequences.”
Previously, Trump had declared that the only alternative to a deal ensuring Iran remains without nuclear weapons would be military intervention. Iranian officials have refused to engage with Trump, dismissing his approach as “bullying.”
On March 15, following Trump’s orders, U.S. warplanes began bombing Houthi targets in Yemen. Just ten days later, on March 25, the White House released a statement declaring that the president had “made the Houthis pay” while securing America's safety by putting its enemies in their place. A significant portion of the statement criticized Joe Biden, and it concluded by calling Trump's operation against the Houthis a “major success.”
At the time of the statement’s release, the U.S., though not officially announcing it, had already begun significantly increasing its military presence on the strategically vital island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The deployment included stealth bombers, transport aircraft, and aerial refueling planes. Located nearly 4,000 kilometers from Iranian shores, the island is beyond the reach of Tehran’s missiles and drones.
Last year, while Biden was still in the White House, B-2 stealth bombers launched strikes from Diego Garcia against Houthi targets. However, those were limited operations that ceased after Ansar Allah pledged to halt its attacks on Israel.
It is possible that the U.S. has now begun preparations for truly large-scale bombings in Yemen. If successful, these strikes could significantly weaken the Houthis’ military capabilities while also serving as a pressure tactic against Iran. Nothing would prevent Trump from writing yet another letter to Ayatollah Khamenei, perhaps this time threatening Iran with Yemen’s fate should it refuse to negotiate a deal.
Moreover, any war against the Houthis is already, in a sense, a war against Iran. Every Iranian proxy is a Tehran ally that will inevitably take up arms the moment its patron faces an external threat. Destroying these proxies’ personnel and weaponry in advance means eliminating assets that Iran could later use in its own war. The only question is whether that war will actually begin.
Right now, the fate of the Middle East largely rests in the hands of a single individual — the same one who once claimed he could end Russia’s war against Ukraine in 24 hours, suggested treating COVID-19 with disinfectant injections, and scrapped the very nuclear deal with Iran that he is now demanding, under the threat of military invasion, be reinstated.
How could this end? The White House may have had objectives beyond just aiding its ally Israel and securing Red Sea shipping lanes from Houthi missiles and drones. There could also be a desire to demonstrate greater effectiveness than Biden showed and, in the process, deal a final blow to Iran’s remaining proxies.
As in any military conflict, the U.S.-Houthi confrontation involves a vast number of hidden but crucial factors. It remains unclear whether U.S. intelligence is bluffing when it claims not to fully understand what weapons the Houthis receive or produce, and in what quantities. The Saudi and Emirati armies, which fought against the Houthis, had access to advanced Western weaponry, while the Houthis were using whatever they could get their hands on — including World War I rifles — and still managed to win.
Of course, this likely points to the low competence of modern Arab armies (a well-documented phenomenon that has even been studied by conflict researchers and ethnographers). But in any case, it does not promise an easy and safe campaign for the Americans. It is also difficult to assess whether Iran, struggling with economic troubles in recent years, is willing to step in and support what may be its last remaining viable proxy. And Iran’s support is the key factor in the Houthis’ efforts to survive as a capable fighting force.
Iran’s support is the key factor in the Houthis’ survival as a capable fighting force
The competence of the new U.S. military leadership and its ability to learn from previous phases of the war — especially those that ended in defeat for Yemen’s government forces and their neighbors — also remains in question. There is reason to believe that the current U.S. president selects individuals for key military positions based not on their analytical and command abilities, but solely for their personal loyalty to him.
The extent of the Houthis’ awareness of U.S. plans should not be underestimated either. Iran undoubtedly aids them with intelligence, but other countries might be doing so as well. Russia, for instance, once threatened to supply the Houthis with more advanced missiles and is known to discuss Middle East policy with Trump — how openly, no one can say. Recently, Putin signed a strategic partnership agreement with Iran and may have even secretly ordered the deployment of Russian military advisers to Yemen to assist the Houthis in organizing attacks in the Red Sea.
Given all this, it is reasonable to assume — albeit cautiously — that the conflict will not escalate beyond bombings and missile strikes against Yemeni territory. U.S. troops are unlikely to be sent to storm Sana’a or hunt for Houthi bases in the deserts and mountains. If there is one area where Donald Trump has shown consistency and principle, it is in his reluctance to expand America’s foreign military presence. During his first term, he initiated the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and pushed for a reduction of forces in Iraq, and he is now flirting with the idea of bringing the American contingent home from Syria.
If Trump maintains this stance, the military campaign against Yemen will likely be limited to regular large-scale bombings of suspected weapons storage or production sites, along with targeted strikes aimed at eliminating key figures in the Houthis’ arms industry.
Most likely, military action against Yemen will be limited to large-scale bombings
Looking at recent history, this method has proven relatively effective. For decades, Israel managed to target and eliminate Hamas leaders and engineers and to destroy weapons arsenals, all while avoiding a full-blown war. Though of course, this strategy changed after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
Now, Israeli officials are calling for the complete defeat of hostile groups. But this scenario is unlikely to cause much concern in the U.S. While the Houthis may be more powerful and capable than Hamas, they are still far from being able to pose a threat to the U.S. — not with Hamas-style hang gliders, and not even with the most advanced missiles in their arsenal.